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BULK SALES LAWS: MEANING TO BE ATTACHED TO THE
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE REQUIREMENTS
PHRASES OF THE STATUTES*
FRANK W. MILLERt
"Bulk Sales Statute" is a generic term employed to describe one
of a group of statutes, similar in outline but markedly dissimilar in
significant detail, aimed at remedying a specific evil.1 All of them
have in common one important limitation: they are inapplicable to
routine mercantile transactions, transactions which lack those un-
usual characteristics which would cause them to fall within the class
of transactions conceived as comprising the "evil to be remedied."
The purpose of this article is to analyze how great a departure from
the routine must be in order to cause the transaction to fall within
the operation of the appropriate bulk sales statute. Several factors
have been made important in the solution of the problem. Although
the legislatures have supplied the original verbalization of these fac-
tors, it has, quite expectedly, been necessary for the courts to breathe
meaning into the legislative language for the purpose of solving
concrete cases.
The statutory requirements which must be met in order that the
particular transaction fall outside the area of the routine vary, but,
broadly speaking, there are three principal ones: (1) the sale must
be "in bulk," (2) it must be "out of the ordinary course of trade,"
(3) it must include a certain proportion of the included property of
the business. This is not to say that all three requirements are found
in all statutes, for the statutory schemes are remarkably diverse in
this regard. Nor may it be concluded that the three are entirely
separate and distinct requirements. Indeed the absence of one of them
in a particular statute may cause the court to give a somewhat differ-
ent meaning to one of the others than would otherwise be the case in
order to fill the gap presumably created by its absence. The inquiry
then is to be whether, and in what combinations, these three factors
*This is the last in a series of three articles by Professor Miller considering
the problem of the kinds and quantity of goods, and the kinds of business covered
by the bulk sales statutes. Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, appears in the
February, 1954, issue, and Bulk Sales Laws: Property Included, appears in the
April, 1954, issue of the WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY. Some ofthe research for the articles was facilitated by funds provided by the American
Law Institute while the author served as research assistant to the Reporter for
Article 6 of the Uniform Commerical Code, Professor Charles Bunn of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School. The author wishes to express his deep ap-
preciation for the encouragement and advice which Professor Bunn has given so
freely.
t Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. See Miller, Bulks Sales Laws: Businesses Included, 1954 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1 at
note 5.
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appear in the various statutes, as well as the techniques used by courts
in utilizing these factors as aids in distinguishing routine from un-
usual transactions.
I. THE MEANING OF "IN BULK"
It is by no means true that all bulk sales statutes require that under
all circumstances a transfer must be "in bulk" as a requisite to its
falling within the scope of the statute. Indeed several of the statutes
make no mention of the words "in bulk" at all,2 while many others
require that the transaction be "in bulk" to fall within their purview
only if the transfer is lacking in certain other characteristics ;3 e.g.,
they may be applicable in their terms not only to all out of the ordi-
nary course of trade transfers, whether or not such transfers are "in
bulk," but also to some transfers which are not out of the ordinary
course of trade but are "in bulk."4 Again, many of the statutes re-
quire specifically that a certain proportion of the property be in-
cluded, 5 while many others state that "any part" is enough,0 and some
2. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-101 to 58-104(1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 427.010 to
427.050 (Vernon 1949); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 483, §§ 1 and 2 (1938).
3. The citations here represent the author's best efforts at translating what is
frequently very unclear statutory language. In so doing I have not availed my-
self of the aid of the cases decided under the statutes at this point, primarily be-
,cause there are practically none in point, but also because of a conviction which
I hope to demonstrate in the course of the article, that the courts have not
sought to solve the problems raised by the statutes by a resort to a close exami-
nation of their provisions in this area. Rather they have looked to cases decided
in other jurisdictions having statutes containing strikingly different language,
or they have spoken of bulk sales statutes generally without noting the important
language variations adverted to above. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1952)
semble; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101(1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); MISS. CoDE ANN. § 274 (1942); Ns.V
C0oP. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949) semble; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1001 (1941);
OKLA STAT. ANN. tit 24 § 71 (1937); S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952); S.D. CODE §
54.0301 (1939) semble; TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 33-2-1 (1953) semble; WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945) semble.
4. See note 3 supra.
5. Major part: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6705 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121 1/2,
§ 78 (Supp. 1952)- Mo ANN. STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1949); R.I. GEN. LAWS c.
483, § 1 (1938); 9.C. CoD. § 11-201 (1952); Substantial part: CAL. CIV. CODE §
3440.1 (Supp. 1953); Large part: KY. R v. STAT. § 377.010 (1953); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69,J 525 (1931); 75%: ARiz. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939); All or substantially all:
WASH. Rsv. C DE § 63.08.010 (1951). In addition the Montana statute requires
that the transaction be of an entire stock or of an entire stock of a particular char-
acter. MONT. Rsv. CoDEs ANN. § 18-204 (1947).
6. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 1 (Supp.
1952); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns 1949); IOWA Cqjs ANN. c. 55, § 555.1
(1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-101 (1949); LA. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950);
ME. REv. STAT. c. 106, § 6 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, § 1 (1947); MIcH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (1937); NEB. REv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952) ; N.H. RIv. LAWS
c. 262, § 43 (1942); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1001 (1941); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW§ 44; N.D. REv. CoDE § 51-0202 (1943); OHIO GEN. CoD ANN. § 11102 (1938);
S.D. CODE § 54.0301 (1939); TEX. 11Ev. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945); VT. REv.
STAT.§ 7846 (1947); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950); W. VA. CoD ANN. § 4001 (1949);
WIs. STAT. § 241.18 (1951); WYO. CObP. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945).
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of them provide that "any part" is enough if the transfer is out of
the ordinary course of trade, but that some specified percentage must
be sold if the transaction is not out of the ordinary course of trade.
7
Furthermore, under the latter alternative, there may or may not be
an additional requirement that the sale be "in bulk."8 Still other
statutes include, in a definition section, a statement that a transfer
is to be deemed "in bulk" if it is a transfer of a specified portion (or
any part) either out of the ordinary course of trade or of substanti-
ally the entire business.' Although the variations are not infinite,
they are numerous. Still it is possible to classify the statutes in such
a way as to point up the characteristics which the statutory language
seems to demand in each class, as well as to illustrate the various
meanings assigned to the phrase "in bulk" as a result of the process
of interpretation.
Many of the statutes in express terms require that a transaction be
both out of the ordinary course of trade and in bulk to come within
their scope.-' Although some of the statutes in that general group
7. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1952); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101 (1953);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 274 (1942); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 71 (1937); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
8. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1952); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101 (1953);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); MISS. CODE ANN. § 274 (1942); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 71 (1937); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934). Although
there is some difficulty in reconciling the seemingly inconsistent sections of the
Nevada statute, it apparently provides that all sales of any part of the mer-
chandise are interdicted if they are "in bulk" and "otherwise than in the ordi-
nary course of trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's
business... ," but that only a sale of "substantially all" of the fixtures is inter-
dicted. NEv. COMP. LAWS §§ 6816 to 6820 (Supp. 1949).
9. D. C. CODE ANN. § 28-1703 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.05 (1944); GA.
CODE ANN. § 28-206 (1952); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAwS art. 83, § 99 (1951);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 79.040 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.010 (1951). In addi-
tion the Kentucky statute defines a bulk sale as "any sale .. . of the whole or
a large part ... in bulk, by auction or otherwise than in the ordinary course of
trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's business ." KY. REv.
STAT. § 377.010 (1953). There is an apparent conflict between the language of
different sections of the Utah statute; compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953)
(providing that all sales must be "in bulk" except sales of specified kinds of
property of specified businesses, and that all sales must be out of ordinary course
except a sale of an entire stock of merchandise, which need merely be "in bulk")
with UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-4 (1953) (providing that all out of ordinary course
sales are included with no mention of "in bulk," but that if entire stock is sold it
must be "in bulk").
10. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953);
COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 1 (Supp. 1952); CONN. GN. STAT. § 6705 (1949); ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 121 1/2, § 78 (Supp. 1952); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns
1949); IOwA COD ANN. C. 555, § 555.1 (1950); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961(1950); ME. REV. STAT. c. 106, § 6 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, § 1 (1947);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (1937); NEB. RV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); NEV. COMP.
LAws §§ 6816 to 6820 (Supp. 1949) (at least as to merchandise); N.H. REV. LAWs
c. 262, § 43 (1942) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940) ; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 44;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-23 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE § 51-0202 (1943); OHIO GEN.
CODE ANN. § 11102 (1938); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945); VT.
REV. STAT. § 7846 (1947); VA. CODE 55-83 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4001
(1949); Wis. STAT. § 241.18 (1951); WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945).
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provide merely that any part of the goods is enough if the two stated
requirements are met,11 others impose an additional requirement, that
some specified proportion of the total goods be sold.1 2 It is in the
latter group of statutes that we find the clearest intrinsic indication
of a legislative purpose to impose three separate and distinct con-
ditions to any transaction's falling within the scope of a bulk sales
statute. Whether the specified proportion has been sold is essentially
a quantitative question, the answer to which is ordinarily a matter of
evidence only, and the meaning of "out of the ordinary course of
trade" is not too difficult to discover, although the application of that
meaning to certain factual situations may prove to be anything but
simple. It clearly has a qualitative connotation-was this how the
seller ordinarily conducted his business?
But when attention is directed to the meaning of the second re-
quirement, that the transfer be "in bulk," the answer is not so clear.
Resort to dictionary definitions reveals two quite different mean-
ings: (1) "bulk" is a word with quantitative connotations; thus it
means "a mass or aggregate, esp. one of large size," or "[t] he main
mass or body; the largest or major portion; as, the bulk of one's
property.""3 "In bulk," however, carries a quite different meaning.
Thus it means "[i]n a mass; not enclosed in separate packages or
divided into parts; in such shape that any desired quantity may be
removed; as, goods shipped or sold in bulk."'14 It is in that sense, of
course, qualitative; it answers the question "how," and not the ques-
tion "how much."
In no jurisdiction whose statute contains all three requirements 5
has a case been found which throws any direct light on the question
of the meaning of the phrase "in bulk." It is not insignificant, how-
ever, that in several of the cases which raised issues of whether a
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 1 (Su p.
1952); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns 1949); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 555, § 55.1
(1950); LA. R~v. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. c. 106, § 6 (1944);
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, 1 (1947); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 19.361 (1937); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); N.H. REV. LAws c. 262, § 43 (1942); N.Y. PIs.
PROP. LAw § 44; N.D. R v. CODS § 51-0202 (1943); OHxo GEN. CODS ANN. §
11102 (1938); Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945); VT. REV. STAT. §
7846 (1947); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950); W. VA. CODS ANN. § 4001 (1949); Wis.
STAT. § 241.18 (1961); WYo. COmp. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945). In addition the
Nevada statute apparently requires that a sale of merchandise must be both out
of the ordinary course of trade and in bulk in order to fall within the statute,
but that a sale of substantially all of the fixtures need be out of ordinary course
but not in bulk. However, it is possible that in the amendment process in Nevada,
some inconsistencies may have been overlooked. NSv. COmp. LAws §§ 6816 to 6820
(Supp. 1949).
12, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); CONN. GuN. STAT. § 6705 (1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121 1/2, § 78 (Supp. 1952)-; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1
(1940); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950).
13. WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARy (2d ed. 1934).
14. Ibid.
15. See note 12 supra.
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particular transaction was out of the ordinary course of trade, or
whether it was a transfer of a "major part," "substantial part," or
"large part," no consideration has been given to the "in bulk" re-
quirement except to characterize the particular transaction as being
or not being "in bulk." ' Since it is clearly unreasonable as a matter
of common-sense interpretation of language to conclude that "in bulk"
has quantitative connotations under such a statute, the phrase must
have a qualitative meaning. And its qualitative connotation must
somehow be different from that accorded the out of the ordinary
course of trade language. The only alternative to acceptance of the
last two statements is the conclusion that the legislature inserted
meaningless words into the statute, certainly the least preferred ex-
planation of all.
An examination of the cases decided under such statutes, however,
leads to the conclusion that the courts which have decided them have
either not considered the "in bulk" language as imposing a require-
ment in addition to the other two, or have not made explicit what
that third requirement might be, perhaps on the assumption that its
meaning is so obvious as to necessitate no explanation.11 In any event
no specific inquiry has been directed to the meaning of the words in
question in any of those cases, the requirement, if indeed the words
were regarded as imposing one, being regarded as satisfied each time
the transaction met the specific quantitative test and the "out of the
ordinary course of trade" test.
But when the cases decided under the other sub-class of the group
of statutes under discussion, i.e., those which provide that any part
is a sufficient proportion to bring the transaction within them pro-
vided that it be out of the ordinary course of trade and in bulk,' 8 are
16. In the following cases there was presented either the question of whether
a sufficient quantity of the total goods was sold to meet the specific quantitative
requirement, or the question of whether the transfer was out of the ordinary
course of trade. In none of the cases did the court indicate any awareness that
the statutory language demands the fulfillment of three and not merely two re-
quirements. In some of them the matter was complicated by the fact that parts
of a business or separate businesses owned by the same persons were sold to
different purchasers, but even in those cases, the courts seemed to derive no aid
from the "in bulk" requirement in reaching their conclusions. Jubas v. Sampsell,
185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950) (California statute); Markwell & Co. v. Lynch,
114 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1940) (California statute); Main v. Hall, 41 F.2d 715
(7th Cir. 1930) (Illinois statute); Schainman v. Dean, 24 F.2d 475 (9th Cir.
1928) (California statute); American Trust & Savings Bank of Kankakee v.
Durham, 298 Fed. 304 (7th Cir. 1924) (Illinois statute); Swern v. Liggett, 51 F.
2d 821 (E.D. Ill. 1931) (Illinois statute); In re Lipman, 201 Fed. 169 (D.C.
N.J. 1912) (New Jersey statute); Shasta Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 85 Cal. App.
468, 259 Pac. 965 (1927); Corrigan v. Miller, 338 Ill. App. 212, 86 N.E.2d 853
(1949); Frieling v. Eming, 248 I1. App. 475 (1928); Ogden Avenue State Bank
v. Cherry, 225 Ill. App. 201 (1922); Larson v. Judd, 200 Ill. App. 420 (1916);
Armfield Co. v. Saleeby, 178 N.C. 298, 100 S.E. 611 (1919).
17. See note 16 supra.
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); Cow. STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 1 (Supp.
1952); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns 1949); IOWA Cone ANN. c. 555, § 555.1
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considered, it becomes immediately apparent that at least one court
has felt the need for ascribing some independent meaning to the
"in bulk" language, although it must be admitted that the attempt
has not been entirely satisfactory. The first case in which a conscious
attempt was made to give some meaning of a qualitative nature to
the "in bulk" requirement is Feldstein v. Fusco.", There it was said
that
[t]he meaning of the words "in bulk" may probably be best un-
derstood by saying that sales in "parcels," "packages" and
"barrels" are not sales in bulk. A sale in bulk is made where
separating, counting, measuring, weighing or dividing in parcels,
packages or barrels does not take place but where the mass and
the heap are sold as one.20
That definition is, of course, consistent with one of the dictionary
definitions quoted earlier,2' and upon superficial examination seems a
sensible meaning to give to the language in question. But upon
further reflection it is readily perceived that its adoption would give
rise to an intolerable situation, one perhaps best illustrated by the
case of Mott v. Reeves.2 2 There the articles sold had been put up in
packages, partly for convenience and partly for their preservation.
After a detailed inventory of the various articles was made for the
purpose of determining the total price to be paid, the articles were
delivered to the purchaser in the original bundles. The purchaser
contended that because of the separation into packages, the taking
of the inventory and the setting of the price on the basis of that in-
ventory, the sale was not in bulk. In rejecting that contention the
court referred to the Feldstein definition but went on to say:
Concededly a purchaser might buy a large part of one's stock
of goods, by selecting a certain number of one article and a
definite amount of another, and not be said to have made a bulk
or mass sale.
But here the undisputed evidence is that the bargain was that
defendant should purchase all the material and articles used...
[by sellers] in the contracting branch of their business. Defen-
dant took it all, whatever it was. It was a mass sale. The listing
was made not for the purpose of the sale itself, but to fix the
(1950); LA. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); ME. Rzv. STAT. c. 106, § 6 (1944);
MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, 1 (1947); MicH. STAT. ANN, § 19.361 (1937); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952); N.H. Rnv. LAWS c. 262, § 43 (1942); N.Y. Pss.
PROP. LAW § 44; N.D. REV. CODE § 51-0202 (1943); Oio GEN. CODE ANN. § 11102(1938); S.D. CODE § 54.0301 (1939); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945);
VT. REV. STAT. § 7846 (1947); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
4001 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 241.18 (1951); WYO. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 41-701
(1945).19. 205 App. Div. 806, 201 N.Y. Supp. 4 (3d Dep't 1923), rev'd on other
grounds, 238 N.Y. 58, 143 N.E. 790 (1924).
20. 205 App. Div. at 809, 201 N.Y. Supp. at 6.
21. Text at note 14 supra.
22. 125 Misc. 511, 211 N.Y. Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aft'd without opinion,
217 App. Div. 718, 215 N.Y. Supp. 889 (4th Dep't 1926), affd mem., 246 N.Y.
567, 159 N.E. 654 (1927).
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price of the whole. The delivery was made in packages for con-
venience and preservation of the goods. I think it must be held
that this was a sale in bulky3
It is to be noted that a new element was thus introduced, an ele-
ment difficult of precise definition, a "mental" element. Thus it ap-
pears that the fact that separating and counting took place will pre-
vent the transaction from being in bulk only in those cases where
there cannot be found a general intention to purchase, as a unit, the
total amount of goods which comprise the subject-matter of the
transaction.
Although the report is scanty, apparently the same contention as
was made in the Mott case was raised in Sternberg v. Rubenstein.2 4
There one-sixth of the stock of a shoe retailer was sold to one person
without compliance with the bulk sales statute; the number of shoes
were counted. The Appellate Division found the Feldstein definition
. adequate for the facts in that case but too narrow to be
applied generally, or the intent and purpose of the statute would
be destroyed. To say that a retail shoe dealer may take the trans-
action out of the language and intent of the statute by "sepa-
rating" and "counting" the number of shoes he sells to another
dealer, when the sale constitutes a large percentage of his stock,
would permit any seller and purchaser to defeat its purpose.2 5
No reference was made to the Mott case, so it is uncertain whether
the mental requirement imposed by that decision still obtains.20
The most recent development took place in a case decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.27 There, a
chattel mortgage, given to secure a demand note for $6,000, covered
thirty-four specifically described articles, which constituted almost
one-half in quantity and value of the mortgagor's entire stock of mer-
chandise. The articles were selected so that their total value would
approximate $7,500, apparently the figure considered proper by the
parties as the value of the collateral to secure the note. Again the
mortgagee urged the Feldstein definition as controlling on the issue
of whether the mortgage was in bulk, asserting that since the mort-
gage was on specifically enumerated items, it was not in bulk. Re-
23. 125 Misc. at 516, 211 N.Y. Supp. at 380.
24. 279 App. Div. 30, 108 N.Y.S.2d 218 (4th Dep't 1951), rev'd on other
groutnds, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953).
25. Id. at 31, 108 N.Y.2d at 219.
26. In Tupper v. Baiiett, 233 Mass. 565, 124 N.E. 427 (1919), the court
found a preconceived intention on the part of the seller to sell his entire stock
of merchandise controlling on the issue of whether the sale of part of it in pur-
suance of that intention was a sale in bulk. For holdings that an auction sale is
not in bulk, see Goetz v. Michael Tauber & Co., 282 Fed. 869 (7th Cir. 1922). See
also, Schwartz v. King Realty & Investment Co., 93 N.J.L. 111, 107 AtI. 60 (Sup.
Ct. 1919); Lowe v. Fairberg, 245 App. Div. 731, 280 N.Y. Supp. 615 (2d Dep't
1935).
27. Davis v. Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank, 204 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1953), motionfor recall of mandate and for leave to petition for rehearing denied, 206 F.2d
388 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
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jecting that contention and relying on the Sternberg case, Judge
Swan said:
The appellant relies on definitions which declare that "bulk"
refers only to merchandise which is neither counted, weighed
nor measured. It argues that its mortgage falls outside such
definition because the mortgaged articles were separated, counted
and identified by the trade name of the article or the name of the
manufacturer, the model number and the serial number where
required. If such listing could avoid the impact of the Bulk
Mortgage Act or the Bulk Sales Act, it would easily be possible
for a retail dealer to dispose of his entire stock of merchandise
without the giving of the notices which the statutes require for
the protection of creditors. Sternberg v. Rubenstein... expressly
disapproved the definition of "in bulk" in Feldstein v. Fusco...
as too narrow to be applied generally. We believe the Sternberg
case represents the correct interpretation of the statute and
think it decisive of the case at bar. When the mortgage covers
a substantial part, in quantity and value, of the mortgagor's
stock of merchandise, we cannot doubt that it is a mortgage "in
bulk." To hold otherwise would create a significant loophole in
the operation of the Act.28 [Italics added.]
Several observations seem pertinent at this point. In the first
place, the language of the bulk mortgages act differs from that of
the bulk sales act, and the difference may be of some significance in
the evaluation of the decisions. The bulk sales act clearly imposes
but two requirements, i.e., that the sale be "in bulk" and that it be
"out of the ordinary course of trade," and states further that the
transfer of "any part" is within the statute if those two requirements
are met.29 The bulk mortgages statute, on the other hand, reads as
follows:
Every mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mort-
gage upon a stock of merchandise in bulk or any part thereof...
shall be void .... 30
It is arguable that "in bulk"' and "any part" are alternative quantita-
tive requirement under that wording, rather than that "a stock"
(meaning the whole stock) and "any part" are the alternative quanti-
tative requirements, which is clearly the situation under the language
of the bulk sales act. Although the distinction was not adverted to,
Judge Galston placed the suggested interpretation on the language
of the bulk mortgage act in the district court decision 1 in the Davis
case. Apparently in response to the contention of the trustee in
bankruptcy that the bulk mortgages act
... covers not only "bulk" assignments of merchandise, but also
transactions in which a substantial part of the entire merchan-
28. 204 F.2d at 433.
29. N.Y. PEsS. PROp. LAw § 44.
30. N.Y. LuN LAw § 230a.
31. In re Arrow Home Appliances, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
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dise inventory of the mortgagor is placed under the lien of the
mortgage, -
he stated:
I think it is clear that there was no sale in bulk as contem-
plated by the statute. Certainly not if "bulk" means the whole of
the merchandise, i.e., all of it. On the other hand, the statute
does apply to "any part" of the merchandise. Carried to its
logical ad absurdum, any part, fractionally, might be one item,
but so to construe it would not fall within the manifest object
of the Act, which is to prevent the perpetration of a fraud on
creditors.... '-
After reviewing some of the cases and noting that the bulk mort-
gages act is in pari iateria with the bulk sales act,34 Judge Galston,
relying primarily on the opinion of the Appellate Division in the
Sternberg case, stated that there was some authority for the propo-
sition that the bulk mortgages act covers "a transaction in which a
substantial part of the merchandise...";- is disposed of. Presumably
the conclusion is that the latter statement is true even though the
transaction is not "in bulk," for the court held the act applicable to
the transaction.
Reference to the language quoted above from Judge Swan's opinion
on appeal reveals, however, that he regarded the significance of the
fact that a substantial part was mortgaged to be that the transfer
was, therefore, one "in bulk."- Consequently, as is apparently the
sense of all of the other cases construing the New York statutes, "in
bulk" was not considered to be an alternative to "any part."
The next point of importance in evaluating the Davis decision is
that it was handed down in ignorance of the fact that the New York
Court of Appeals had reversed the Appellate Division in the Sternberg
case. -' When that fact came to light, certain observations of Judge
Swan, in the course of an opinion denying a motion to vacate the
judgment in the Davis case, must be observed. First, however, the
significance of the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the Sternberg
case must be assessed. By a divided court, the case was reversed on
the specific ground that the Appellate Division's construction of the
"out of ordinary course" language was incorrect. But Judge Fuld,
writing for the majority of the court, introduced his discussion of
the meaning of "out of ordinary course" by some sweeping statements
as to the general applicability of the statute, and more particularly,
about the relative size requirement which must be met in order for
the statute to be considered applicable. He said:
32. In re Arrow Home Appliances, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
33. Id. at 917.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Davis v. Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank, 204 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir. 1953).
37. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953).
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Recognizing the onerous nature of the restrictions imposed
upon transactions within its scope, this court early construed
the Bulk Sales Act as being meant to apply only in "rare and
irregular cases," only to the "extraordinary sale * * * such as
can occur but few times in the life of a merchant" ....
Following this guide, our courts have limited the reach of this
statutory provision to cases involving the sale of substantially
an entire inventory or business.38
In support of the latter statement Judge Fuld cited Matt v. Reeves, 0
Ben Bimberg & Co., Inc. v. Unity Coat & Apron Co., Inc.,1 Texas
Co. v. Drexeliu,- and referred to New York Credit Men's Ass'n. v.
Domestic Broadtail Producers.42 It is true that in each of the cited
cases, all of which construe the New York statute, all or substantially
all of the business was transferred, but it is also true that the relative
size of the transfer was not the issue in any of them.
Several considerations must be weighed in any analysis of the im-
pact of the statement on New York law as well as of its intrinsic
soundness. First of all, Judge Fuld's statement is a dictum in no way
38. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 122 N.E.2d 210 (1953).
39. 125 Misc. 511, 211 N.Y. Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1925), affd without opinion,
217 App. Div. 718, 215 N.Y. Supp. 889 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 246 N.Y.
567, 159 N.E. 654 (1927). The issues in that case were three: (1) the right of
the trustee in bankruptcy to bring the action, (2) whether the items sold con-
stituted merchandise, and (3) whether the sale was "in bulk." But it must be
noted that the more particular inquiry thought determinative of whether the
sale was "in buk related to the applicability of the Feldstein requirement that
no separating or counting take place, i.e., there was no dispute in the case as to
whether a sufficient quantity had been sold, the only inquiry on that point being
whether the way in which it was sold kept the transaction outside the statute.
The court resolved all issues against the purchaser. See text at note 23 supra
40. 150 Misc. 336, 270 N.Y. Supp. 580 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 44 App. Div.
777, 280 N.Y. Supp. 220 (1st Dep't 1935). The issue in the case was whether
the sale of laundered coats, aprons, linens, etc. belonging to a business which
rented them to customers was the sale of merchandise. Again there was no dis-
pute as to whether enough had been sold.
41. 176 Misc. 371, 27 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1941). The only issue in the
case was whether a partnership operating several enterprises should have listed
all of the partnership creditors in complying with the statute in selling one of
the enterprises, or merely those creditors who had extended credit because of
the conduct of the particular business sold. The court held that all partnership
creditors had to be listed.
42. 61 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). The decision here was that the trans-
fer in question was not out of the ordinary course of trade. The case clearly
states that whether the sale was "in bulk" did not have to be decided, but thejudge went on to point out that there are no New York decisions of an authori-
tative nature as to the meaning of the phrase. That the judge thought of the
"in bulk" language as imposing some kind of quantitative requirement is indi-
cated by the following language:
There seem to be no authoritative decisions in New York which directly
define a bulk sale. In all the cases that have come to my attention, the en-
tire stock, or substantially the entire stock, of the merchant was transferred.
But the phrase "any part or the whole" is certainly subject to the interpreta-
tion that the size of the transfer is insignificant.
Id. at 105. Attention is directed to the fact, however, that Judge Conger recog-
nized clearly the difficulty of conceiving the "in bulk" language as imposing a




necessary to the decision in the case, but, on the other hand, the
Court of Appeals has so rarely in recent years considered a bulk sales
case to be of sufficient importance to warrant the writing of an
opinion, that the mere fact that two opinions were written entitle the
case to unusual consideration. Secondly, the language in question
appears to fly directly in the teeth of the statute. The New York
Bulk Sales statute4 states clearly that a transaction is covered by
it if any part is sold, provided that the transfer be both "in bulk" and
"out of the ordinary course of trade." There is no suggestion in Judge
Fuld's opinion that "out of ordinary course of trade" has quantitative
connotations, although it is arguable that it does.4 But even assum-
ing, argndo, that quantitative connotations are to be found in the
"out of ordinary course" language, they would be limitations of a
much smaller magnitude than those described by Judge Fuld. Thus
the only specific part of the statute which could be relied on to supply
the missing factor is the "in bulk" language; but no reference was
made to that language as the basis for the statement. Instead, Judge
Fuld chose to view the statute as a whole, including the need in re-
sponse to which it was enacted45 as well as the onerous conditions it
imposes,',, and on that basis considered that it had no application to
transactions which varied but slightly from the routine.4 7 Although
Judge Fuld's position may be, and probably is, sound as a matter of
policy judgment, yet the language of the statute reflects a different
judgment on the point, a judgment made by the organ of government
entrusted with making it, at least in the first instance and to the
extent that it is able to express that judgment unambiguously in
statutory language. Although the giving of some quantitative con-
notation to the "in bulk" language may be justified as a matter of
resolving ambiguous language, certainly it is not a tenable argument
to say that the statute states, as cumulative requirements, both that
the sale may be of any part and must be of practically all. Yet that is
the result of the reasoning in the majority opinion, although the
avoidance of reference to the specific language of the statute renders
the unsatisfactory nature of the resolution of the conundrum less
patent than would otherwise be the case. In effect, the Court of
Appeals has stricken from the statute the "any part" language, and
has substituted therefor a requirement that the transfer be of sub-
stantially all of the business or of substantially an entire inventory
thereof, perhaps by utilizing the "in bulk" language, perhaps not.
43. N.Y. PEAS. PRop. LAW § 44.
44. See text at Section Ila in/ ra.
45. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 238, 112 N.E.2d 210, 211 (1953).
46. Id. at 239, 112 N.E.2d at 212.
47. Ibid.
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Turning again to the Davis ligitation, we find Judge Swan denying
a motion to vacate the judgment in the case.48 The motion was bot-
tomed on the idea that his earlier opinion had rested primarily on a
decision of an intermediate appellate court, reversed in fact by the
highest court of the state prior to the rendition of the decision in the
federal case. Judge Swan's denial of the motion was based on the
ground that the state reversal had been for a reason unconnected
with the part of the intermediate appellate court's opinion on which
the federal court relied.49 That Judge Swan was on sound ground
in so interpreting the Court of Appeals holding in the Sternberg case
is clear, for no mention was made of the Felstein test as being either
satisfactory or unsatisfactory in that opinion. It is possible, however,
that under the broad dictum as to the amount which must be included
found in the Sternberg opinion, the Davis case was incorrectly de-
cided.50 And to the extent that the dictum was somehow based on the
idea that it resulted from the requirement that the transfer be "in
bulk," the two opinions may be inconsistent. For certainly Judge
Swan regards the "in bulk" language as imposing, as a maximum, a
requirement that a substantial part be disposed of, whereas Judge
Fuld regards the statute (whether or not because of the "in bulk"
requirement) as applicable only to transactions in which substantially
the entire business or an entire inventory is disposed of.
Several possibilities are thus presented by this confusing and con-
tradictory handling of statutory language. One possibility is that the
original qualitative definition given the "in bulk" language in the
Feldstein case, even as limited by the Mott refinement (that it is
applicable only where there was no preconceived intention to sell
whatever part was sold as an aggregate, with the counting and sepa-
rating being a mere matter of convenience in determining the price),
no longer has any importance. If that be the correct interpretation,
then it becomes necessary to determine whether there is any vitality
left in the "in bulk" language, and, if so, what its nature is. One
possibility is that suggested in the Davis case, i.e., that a sale is
"in bulk" if it is of a substantial part; another is that the broad
dictum in the Sternberg opinion in the Court of Appeals is controlling
and that it is based on the "in bulk" language. Still another pos-
sibility is that the "in bulk" language in the bulk sales statute has a
different meaning from that in the bulk mortgages statutes. The
latter conclusion is implicit in the opinion of the district judge in
48. Davis v. Lawrence-Cedarhurst Bank, 206 F.2d 388 (1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 877 (1953).
49. Id. at 389.
50. It should be noted that Judge Fuld's language would require the disposal
of substantially the entire stock or substantially an entire inventory whereas on
the facts of the Davis case, it appears that less than one-half of tAe stock was
subject to the chattel mortgage.
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the Dais litigation. Finally it is possible that the Feldstein case,
as modified by the Mott case, is still law in New York. But it is
dubious that the situation which it apparently contemplates could
arise as a matter of commercial practice.
By way of critique of the cases interpreting the New York statutes,
it may be admitted that the original definition, in its unmodified
form, is not acceptable, for it would truly nullify the effectiveness
of the statute. Although the gloss added by the Mott case is an
appealing one, yet it is not only difficult of precise proof, but it also
contemplates a situation not likely to arise as a matter of commercial
practice. But the alternative, in the thinking of the courts, is to give
the "in bulk" language a quantitative meaning under a statute which
in so many words states that there is no minimum requirement.
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that "in bulk" has a dictionary
meaning which is quantitative in nature as well as one which is
qualitative in nature, the quantitative meaning is not a half-way one.
Used quantitatively, "in bulk" means all or practically all. To give the
meaning "all or substantially all" to the language (which I believe
Judge Fuld to have done) is unjustifiable in view of the "any part"
language; but to give it the "substantial part" meaning attributed
to it by Judge Swan is to give it a meaning which is not in accord
with either of the standard English meanings of the words. When the
fact that "out of ordinary course," although basically a qualitative
term, has necessary quantitative overtones (as will be pointed out)"
which make it clear that truly insignificant sales are never included,
the difficulties of assigning some sensible meaning to the "in bulk"
language are increased even more.
Before the attempt is abandoned as hopeless, one more case must
be considered. In Sorrin v. Pacific Finance Corporation52 separate
chattel mortgages were given on various cars comprising the stock
of an automobile dealer. Although the giving of the mortgages was
pursuant to a general financing scheme, the mortgagor was not bound
to deal exclusively with one lender, and he did in fact execute mort-
gages on cars to at least one other lender. In rejecting the contention
that the mortgages were void for failure to comply with the bulk
mortgages act, the court emphasized that they were separate mort-
gages on individual cars. Judge Galston stated:
Thus neither in terms nor substance was the mortgaging of its
automobiles as and when purchased on loans from different
sources "a stock of merchandise in bulk or any part thereof" as
contemplated by the bulk mortgages act .... 5
51. See text at notes 73 to 82 inf!ra.
52, 37 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
53. Id. at 529.
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Is it possible to draw any conclusion from this case as to the mean-
ing of "in bulk?" A possible meaning is that a transfer is "in bulk"
only when the requisite amount or proportion of the property (as
determined by whatever the quantitative connotations of the "out of
ordinary course" language may be) is sold out of ordinary course
of trade to one or a group of persons who are somehow connected in
interest, and within a sufficiently short period of time so that the
technically separate transfers can be viewed in the eyes of the law as
one transaction. That meaning would explain why, in the usual bulk
sales situation, the courts have felt no need to discuss whether the
transaction was "in bulk,"54 for a sale of the requisite amount in one
transaction to one person would be clearly "in bulk." The general
problem of the effect of a series of transfers, either to the same or to
different persons, has not been dealt with by the courts in any uni-
form manner, probably because the solution of the problem often is
affected by other statutory requirements than the "in bulk" one.
Consequently a separate section 5 of this article will be devoted to a
consideration of the various problems which arise from such a fact
situation.
"In bulk" has, however, been given quantitative meaning under
the Massachusetts statute" which also provides that the sale of any
part of the goods is enough, provided that the transaction be both in
bulk and out of the ordinary course of trade. Although in one early
federal case interpreting that statute the judge stated that he knew
of ". .. no case in which the sale of less than an entire stock in trade
has been so regarded, ' 57 in Tupper v. Barrett58 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts made it clear that the sale of something less
than an entire stock in trade could be in bulk. The court, in the latter
case, however, placed great weight on the fact that the seller had
previously formed an intention to dispose of his entire stock of goods.
Certainly the conclusion that a transaction may be in bulk under a
statute proscribing the sale of any part only if it is a sale of all of
the stock in trade is indefensible and in defiance of plain statutory
language.
Some of the statutes define the term "in bulk" in various ways, so
that instead of its being a separate requirement, it serves as a kind
of collective label for a transaction in which the other statutory re-
quirements have been met. Thus, under the statutes of the District
54. See text at notes 16 to 17 supra.
55. See Section II infra.
56. MAss. AN. LAWS c. 106, §§ 1 and 2 (1947).
57. Carpenter v. Karnow, 193 Fed. 762, 765 (D.C. Mass. 1911).
58. 233 Mass. 565, 124 N.E. 427 (1919).
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of Columbia,5',* Florida,6' Georgia," Maryland62 and Oregon,63 as
well as an earlier Washington statute,' "in bulk" is separately defined
so as to include all out of ordinary course sales on the one hand, and
all sales of substantially the entire business (presumably whether or
not out of the ordinary course of trade) on the other hand. The
Kentucky statute's5 defines "in bulk" as either a large part out of the
ordinary course of trade or a large part at auction, as does the Penn-
sylvania statute." The Montana statute67 defines a sale in bulk as one
of an entire stock or an entire stock of a particular character, and the
Washington statute' defines it as one in which all or substantially all
of a stock of goods is sold out of the ordinary course of trade. No
cases have been decided under any of these statutes which in any
direct manner throw light on the meaning of the "in bulk" language63
To recapitulate: some efforts have been made to give a particular
and independent meaning to the "in bulk" language under statutes
which do not contain an internal definition of the term, but the efforts
have been markedly unsuccessful. Although from the earlier New
York cases the idea may be derived that "in bulk" has, as a qualitative
requirement, the meaning that a separating, counting or weighing
will take the transfer out of the operation of the statute, provided
that there is no general and pre-formed intention to sell whatever
59. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1703 (1951).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.05 (1944).
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 28-206 (1952).
62. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 83, § 99 (1951).
6:. ORE. REV. STAT. § 79.040 (1953).
64. Wash. Laws 1913, c. 175, § 4.
6;. Ky. REV. STAT. § 377.010 (1953).
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 525 (1931).
67. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 18-204 (1947).
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.060 (1951).
69. The "in bulk" language may, however, have an indirect effect, though one
not capable of being demonstrated in the cases. Thus, under statutes like the
earlier Washington statute which provided that[a]ny sale or transfer of a stock of goods, wares, or merchandise, or all or
substantially all, of the fixtures and equipment used in and about the business
of the vendor, out of the usual or ordinary course of business or trade of
the vendor, or whenever substantially the entire business or trade theretofore
conducted by the vendor, shall be sold or conveyed.., shall be deemed a sale
and transfer in bulk in contemplation of this act ....(Wash. Laws 1913, c. 175), it is arguable that the only applicable quantitative
limitation is found in the alternative situation, i.e., when all or substantially all
is sold without regard to the out of ordinary course criterion, and that the latter
criterion is the only one applicable when less than that amount is sold. That
argument, however, seems not to have been convincing to the court in the follow-
ing cases decided under statutes of this type, for in them the courts have rather
seemed to think that the least amount which could be sold was "substantially all."
Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923); Fudge v. Brown,
126 Wash. 475, 218 Pac. 251 (1923). And see Long Cigar and Grocery Co. v.
Harvey, 33 Ga. App. 236, 125 S.E. 870 (1924) semble. It is possible that the
presence of "in bulk" language in the statutes may have had some effect on the
court's attitude toward the problem. For the solution suggested earlier in the
footnote, and the one believed by this writer to be the correct one, see Goldstein
v. Maloney, 62 Fla. 198, 57 So. 342 (1911).
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the total quantity might turn out to be as a unit or aggregate, that
interpretation has been at least seriously weakened if not completely
emasculated by the latest cases construing the New York statutes.
The alternative suggested by those cases, i.e., that "in bulk" is a
quantity requirement, is a most unsatisfactory resolution of the prob-
lem in the light of the specific language of the New York bulk sales
act. At least one case decided under the New York bulk mortgages
act suggests a different criterion, a criterion of a qualitative nature
which would resolve the difficulty created by the ambiguous statutory
language. The concept of "in bulk" there suggested is that the trans-
action or transactions under consideration as possibly violative of the
act must be related both as to time and as to purchasers in such a
way that under the judicial microscope there will appear a slide which
can be viewed as a unit or aggregate.
Although the Massachusetts cases contain suggestions that "in
bulk" poses a definitely quantitative limitation on the applicability of
the statute, it is difficult to conclude, either from the statutory lang-
uage or the interpretations given to the statutes as a whole, that "in
bulk" adds a quantity limit which would not otherwise be present.
And this is true in spite of the fact that the transactions which gave
rise to bulk sales legislation were of the type in which all or substan-
tially all of the merchandise was disposed of in a single transaction.
Some support for my conclusion may be obtained from the fact that
in many states, the legislature clearly did not conceive of the "in
bulk" language as imposing a separate requirement at all; for it was
thought necessary that the language be defined in the statute itself,
and the definitions employed were merely summaries of the other re-
quirements. Finally, although the language is ambiguous, it should
be construed in context, and it is difficult to resolve the ambiguity by
saying that "in bulk" relates primarily to the size of the transfer. 0
II. THE MEANING OF
"OUT OF THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRADE"
Every bulk sales statute requires that under some circumstances
a transfer must be out of the ordinary course of trade to fall within
its operation;71 most of the statutes state that only out of ordinary
70. A contrary conclusion was reached in Billig and Branch, The Problem of
Transfers under Bulk Sales Laws: A Study of Absolute Transfers and Liquidat-ing Trusts, 35 MxICH. L. Rnv. 732, 739 et seq. (1937). In Legis., 82 U. of PA. L.
rv. 856 (1934), the author considers the problem from the more general view-
point of whether transactions of various sizes are included within the statutes
without detailed consideration of whether transfers of small size are excluded
by reason of a specific quantitative requirement, the "in bulk" language, or the
"out of ordinary course" language. It is reasonably clear, however, from a read-ing of the entire note that the author conceives the "in bulk" requirement as
being qualitative in nature rather than quantitative.
71. ALA. CoDE. tit. 20, §§ 10 to 14 (Supp. 1952); Aiuz. CoDS ANN. § 58-301(1939) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-1501 to 68-1504 (1947); CAL. CJxY. CODS § 3440.1
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course transfers are interdicted.7 2 Although the primary meaning of
the phrase would seem to be "different from the way in which things
are ordinarily done," the language may provide a quantitative test as
well. The principal problem which has developed in the cases, how-
ever, is the meaning of the words "seller's business" in the phrase
"out of the ordinary course of the seller's business."
a. Quantitative uses of the criterion.
Two cases decided under statutes which have no specific quantita-
tive limitation, i.e., provide that the transfer of any part of the in-
(Supp 1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, §§ I to 3 (Supp. 1952); CONN. GEN. STAT.
J§ 6705 to 6707 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2101 to 2104 (1953); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 28-1701 to 28-1705 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 726.02 to 726.06 (1944);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 28-203 to 28-206 and 28-9901 (1952); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
64-701 to 64-705 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 1211, §§ 78-80a (Supp. 1952); INn.
ANN. STAT. §§ 33-201 to 33-203 (Burns 1949); IOWA CODE ANN. C. 555, §§ 555.1
to 555.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-101 to 58-104 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT.
if 377.010 to 377.990 (1953); LA. REM. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2961 to 9:2968 (1950);
AE. REV. STAT. C. 106, §§ 6 and 7 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWs art. 83,
J§ 97 to 101 (1951); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 106, §§ 1 and 2 (1947); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19.361 to 19.363 (bulk sales), 19.371 to 19.373 (bulk mortgages)
(1937); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (Vest 1947); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 274,
277 and 278 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 427.010 to 427.050 (Vernon 1949);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §R 18-201 to 18-205 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 36-501
to 36-502 (1952); NEV. COMP. LAWS §§ 6816 to 6820 (Supp. 1949); N.H.
REV. LAWS c. 262, §§ 43 and 44 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:29-1 to 46:29-3
(1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-1001 to 53-1003 (1941); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW
§ 44 (bulk sales), N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230a (bulk mortgages); N.C. GEN. STAT.
39-23 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 51-0201 to 51-0204 (1943); OHIO GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 11102 to 11103-1 (1938); OKL&. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 71 to 74 (1937);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 79.010 to 79.040 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 521 to 529
t1931) (but subsequent to July 1, 1954 Article 6 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE will govern the law of bulk tranfers in Pennsylvania); R.L GEN. LAWS
c. 483, §§ 1 and 2 (1938); S.C. CODE §§ 11-201 to 11-206 (1952); S.D. CODE
§§54.0301 to 54.0308 and 55.9901 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 7283 to 7285
(Williams 1934); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4001 to 4003 (1945); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 25-2-1 to 25-2-5 (1953); VT. REV. STAT. §§ 7846 and 7847 (1947);
VA. CODE §§ 55-83 to 55-86 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 63.08.010 to 63.08.060
(1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4001 to 4006 (1949); WIS. STAT. §§ 241.18 to
241.21 (1951); Wyo. COMp. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-701 to 41-703 (1945).
72. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 68-1501 to 68-
1504 (1947); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, §§
I to 3 (Supp. 1952); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6705 to 6707 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT.
c. 1211, §§ 70 to 80a (Supp. 1952); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 33-201 to 22-203 (Burns
1949); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 555, §§ 555.1 to 555.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-
101 to 58-104 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2961 to 9:2968 (1950); ME. R V.
STAT. c. 106, §§ 6 and 7 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, §§ 1 and2 (1947); MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 19.361 to 19.363 (bulk sales), 19.371 to 19.373 (bulk mortgages)
(1937); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 427.010 to 427.050 (Vernon 1949); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 18-201 to 18-205 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 36-501 to 36-502 (1952);
N.H. REv. LAWS c. 262, §§ 43 and 44 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:29-1 to 46:
29-3 (1940); N.Y. PEns. PRoP. LAW § 44 (bulk sales), N.Y. LIEN LAW § 230a
(bulk mortgages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 51-0201
to 51-0204 (1943); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 11102 to 11103-1 (1938); R.I. GEN.
LAWS c. 483, §§ 1 and 2 (1938); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4001 to 4003
(1945); VT. REV. STAT. §§ 7846 and 7847 (1947); VA. CODE §§ 55-83 to 55-86
(1950); WASH. REy. CODE §§ 63.08.010 to 63.08.060 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN.§§ 4001 to 4006 (1949); WIS. STAT. §§ 241.18 to 241.21 (1951); WYO. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-701 to 41-703 (1945). It is not clear from seemingly inconsistent
o visions of the Nevada statute whether under all circumstances a transfer must
out of ordinary course in order to come within the statute. NEv. Corp,. LAWS
§§ 6816 to 6820 (Supp. 1949).
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eluded goods is forbidden if the transfer be in bulk and out of the
ordinary course of trade, indicate that the out of ordinary course
criterion serves as a substitute for a quantity minimum. Thus in
Fiske Rubber Co. v. Hayes,73 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held
that the inclusion of from $35 to $40 worth of a stock of a retail auto
parts business in the sale of a related automobile agency was no
greater in volume or value than an ordinary retail sale and so did
not fall within the statute. And in Krueger v. Hammond,"' the
Supreme Court of Kansas took a similar position. There the seller
was engaged in the garage business and performed those services
usually performed by garagemen. He purchased fifteen tires and six-
teen tubes which he offered for sale at retail though he carried no
other accessories or tubes or tires. After making some sales, he had
remaining on hand four tubes and eight tires, which he sold to an-
other retail dealer without complying with the bulk sales statute.
The court held the transaction outside the scope of the statute on
the ground that it was not outside the ordinary course of business,
although the court was not overly-careful to distinguish between the
question of whether the out of ordinary course requirement had been
met and the more general question of whether the transaction some-
how violated the statute. The court stated that:
[t] he articles.., were so few and so diminutive that a disposal
of them cannot be regarded as a bulk sale. They constituted mer-
chandise, of course, and were a part of his stock, but the things
sold were so small in number and value that they cannot be re-
garded as within the spirit and reason of the law. Neither can it
well be said that the sale of that number of articles to one per-
chaser was outside of the ordinary course of the trade or business
of the seller. It included no more tubes than were essential to a
single car, and no more casings than would be necessary to equip
two cars, and must be regarded as a small retail trsa4tiom
[Italics added.] T
The strongest argument that the "out of ordinary course" language
was intended to serve as a qualitative measure can be made under
statutes in which it is merely an alternative requirement. Of these
there are two principal classes: (1) those which require that the
73. 131 Ark. 248, 199 S.W. 96 (1917).
74. 123 Kan. 319, 255 Pac. 30 (1927).
75. Id. at 320, 255 Pac. at 30. It should be noted that the Kansas statute
imposes no requirement that the transfer be "in bulk," though the statute is
called a bulk sales statute. KAN. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-101 to 58-104 (1949). See
also Ethridge, J., dissenting, in Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss. 34, 41, 150 So. 198,
199 (1933), for an indication that the out of ordinary course requirement is at
least in part quantitative in nature. In Shasta Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 86 Cal.
App. 468, 259 Pac. 965 (1927), the court held that the transfer of 123,326 feet of
lumber by a sawmill company to a company operating a lumberyard was not,
as a matter of law, outside the ordinary course of trade, where there was no
evidence of the size of the total stock of the transferor at the time of the transfer.
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transfer be either (a) out of the ordinary course of trade, or (b)
of the entire stock in bulk ;" (2) those which require that the trans-
fer be either (a) out of the ordinary course of trade, or (b) of sub-
stantially the entire business to one or more persons.77 In both classes
of statutes, it is apparent that the single clearly quantitative require-
ment is imposed only in one of two alternative situations: if all or
substantially all is sold, there is no out of ordinary course require-
ment; on the other hand, if less than that amount is sold, there is
such a requirement, and it is certainly tenable to argue that the out
of ordinary course language in that branch of the alternatives has
a quantitative connotation. Although there are no holdings based on
such a rationale in cases decided under those statutes, there is lan-
guage in one Georgia case which suggests it.78
It should not be thought, however, that all transfers of a large
proportion of the stock of a business are necessarily out of the ordi-
nary course of trade. In Hart v. Brierly, a biscuit manufacturing
company entered into a contract to sell to one person a quantity of its
product already manufactured and, in addition, the entire output
of its bakery for a period of at least three months following. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that although the busi-
ness was an included one, the transfer in question was not out of the
ordinary course of trade. The court said:
Where a going mercantile business is so conducted that to be
profitable large quantities of goods must be sold to different cus-
tomers, even to the extent of exhausting the entire stock which
may be on hand at any stated time, such a sale is not voidable
although all the stock in the seller's possession at the time may be
delivered to a single buyer.
The statutory test is whether the sale was made in the usual
way in which a merchant owing debts conducts his business, or
whether he takes an unusual method of disposing of his property
in order to get the money for his own use, leaving his creditors
unpaid. This inquiry is essentially an issue of fact depending
upon the nature of the seller's business, his ordinary method of
making sales, and his indebtedness. A sale of his entire stock by
one trader might not be uncommon, while such a sale if made by
another would be extraordinary and within the statute.80
76. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1952); DL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101
(1953); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); Miss. CODE ANN. § 274 (1942);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 71 (1937); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7823 (Williams
1934); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953).
77. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-1703 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.05 (1944); GA.
CODE ANN. § 28-206 (1952); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWs art. 83, § 99 (1951);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 79.040 (1953). In addition, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West
1947), provides that "[elvery sale of a portion of stock of merchandise, other-
wise than in the ordinary course of the seller's business, and every sale of an
entire stock of merchandise, shall be presumed fraudulent. .. .
78. Goodman v. Clarkson, 39 Ga. App. 383, 147 S.E. 183 (1928).
79. 189 Mass. 598, 76 N.E. 286 (1905).
80. Id. at 601, 76 N.E. at 287. It must be noted, however, that no little stress
was placed on the fact that a perishable commodity was the subject matter of
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b. Qualitative uses of the criterion.
As suggested earlier,8 if out of ordinary course is to be used as a
qualitative criterion it should pose a question of the "how" type.
Was the manner in which the seller went about disposing of his in-
ventory, or part of it, a method of disposal which was usual or un-
usual? Several elements might be considered relevant in the resolu-
tion of such a question. 82 Thus, the state of mind of the seller as well
as his solvency might be considered important: and so might the
question of the effect of the transfer on the ability of the seller to
continue his business in substantially the same manner as before the
transfer and that of the adequacy of the consideration. In fact, such
elements have received but scant attention in the cases, probably for
the reason that they involve inquiries which, of necessity, have a
tendency to complicate the determination of a question which, from
the viewpoint of commercial practice, should be simple and certain.
One of the major initial reasons for the passage of bulk sales legisla-
tion was to avoid the difficulty of proving that the purchaser had a
fraudulent state of mind; and to reintroduce a mental element into
the determination of whether a particular transfer fell within the
statute would tend to cause the original difficulty to reappear, though
perhaps in somewhat different form.
Adequacy of consideration, solvency of the seller, ability to con-
tinue business, and an improper state of mind would be factors of
great importance under those statutes which merely raise a rebut-
table presumption of fraud in case of failure to comply with the
statute.8 3 They are of no demonstrable significance, on the other hand,
in cases decided under statutes which provide that a transfer not in
compliance with the statute is void as to creditors. 4 For, in spite of
the occasional statements referred to in the previous footnote, it is of
great significance that in the hundreds of decided cases almost no
the transaction in the case. Quaere, whether the same result would obtain if
the entire supply of steel rails on hand of a large steel mill were sold to one
person in the absence of an established pattern of similar sales?
81. See Section I supra.
82. For a discussion of this problem, the conclusions of which are in agree-
ment with those reached herein, see Billig and Branch, supra, note 70, at 735-738.
83. E.g., under an earlier New York statute, a sale not in compliance merely
gave rise to a rebuttable presumption of fraud. N.Y. Laws 1907, c. 722. In
Wallach v. Baumryter, 170 App. Div. 618, 156 N.Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1915)
aff'd mem., 224 N.Y. 652, 121 N.E. 896 (1918), the facts that there were full
consideration, solvency at the time of the transfer and an absence of evidence
to support any finding that the transfer was made with intent to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors, served to rebut the presumption arising from non-com-
pliance with that statute.
84. Dicta in two cases are opposed to each other on the point. In Kirkholder
& Rausch Co. v. Bridgland, 120 Misc. 565, 199 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1923)
aiff'd mem., 211 App. Div. 838, 206 N.Y. Supp. 923 (4th Dep't 1924), decided
under a later New York statute which made all transfers not in compliance
therewith conclusively fraudulent (N.Y. Laws 1914, c. $07), the court rejected
a contention that because full value was paid and the money applied to the
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reference has been made to any of those elements as factors influenc-
ing decision.*'
What, then, have been the elements which have been convincing to
courts on the issue of whether a transfer was or was not out of ordi-
nary course of trade? Certainly most of the cases have been concerned
with whether the purchaser fell into the class of customers with whom
the seller usually dealt. To illustrate: a retailer usually sells in small
quantities to persons who buy for their own consumption or use rather
than for resale; so a sale by one retailer to another in the same busi-
ness is regarded, prima facie, as out of the ordinary course of trade5 6
payment of the seller's debts, the act was inapplicable. However, the court,
citing the Wallach case, note 83 supra, went on to say:
If . [seller] had been solvent at the time of the transfer, if he received
full value for the goods and applied the proceeds to the payment of his
debts, then it is possible that the transfer might not have been held invalid.
120 Misc. at 566, 199 N.Y. Supp. at 114. The court goes on to point out, however,
that the statute was changed since the decision in the Wallach case. Yet it
remains true that the statement quoted would suggest that not only adequacy of
consideration, but also solvency of the seller would be factors in determining
the applicability of the statute.
On the other hand, the Massachusetts court in Merchants Discount Co. v.
Esther Abselon, Inc., 297 Mass. 517, 9 N.E.2d 528 (1937), stated that solvency
of the seller was completely immaterial under the bulk sales statute.
Language may be found in a few cases which suggests that the state of mind
of the seller may be important. Part of the test of whether the transfer is out
of ordinary course was stated to be whether the seller ". . . takes an unusual
method of disposing of his property in order to get the money for his own use
.... "[talics added.] Hart v. Brierly, 189 Mass. 598, 601, 76 N.E. 286, 287(1905). And in Tupper v. Barrett, 233 Mass. 565, 569, 124 N.E. 427, 428 (1919),
the court said:
* . . it also could have been found that when the sale to the plaintiff was
made . .. [seller] had formed the intention of selling his entire stock of
merchandise, and that the sale to the plaintiff was in pursuance of that
intention and was a 'sale in bulk' of part of a stock of merchandise, rather
than in the ordinary course of trade in the regular and usual prosecution
of the seller's business.... [Italics added.]
It is, of course, impossible to tell whether the state of mind discussed made the
sale "in bulk" or "out of ordinary course" or even whether they were regarded
by the court as separate requirements. Finally in Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305
N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953), reversing 279 App. Div. 30, 108 N.Y.S.2d 218(4th Dep't 1951), it seems clear that the fact that the sale was made in order to
enable the seller to remain in business rather than as a means of discontinuing
it was of prime importance. See also Slaughter v. Cooper Corporation, No. 2,
20 Tenn. App. 241, 97 S.W.2d 648 (1936); Henry King & Co. v. Arnett Bros., 7
Tenn. App. 410 (1928).85. In fact, in Sabin v. Horenstein, 260 Fed. 754 (9th Cir. 1919), the court,
in a determination of whether the transfers in question were out of ordinary
course, found that whether seller made them with intent to hinder, delay and
defraud creditors was immaterial, so long as there was no showing that buyerjoined in that fraudulent intent. This case demonstrates, that while the purpose
of the legislation was to avoid the necessity of proving that a purchaser con-
curred in a seller's fraudulent intent in order to avoid a transaction, the method
adopted in drafting the legislation was not, in the final analysis, designed to
establish a conclusive presumption of such concurrence and thus convert what
would not otherwise be a fraudulent conveyance into one, but rather was to
render such concurrence of intent legally immaterial and to substitute for it
certain specific requirements which bore no necessary relationship to the ex-
ixtence of fraud in fact.
86. See Billig and Branch, supra note 70 at 737.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
It is, of course, incidentally true that sales in the latter group will
almost invariably be larger than the seller's usual transactions,T
and usually it is not possible to separate these factors and evaluate
them independently of one another. It has already been shown that,
under some circumstances, the out of ordinary course language
serves as a relative quantitative minimum,88 but it has also been
pointed out that very large transactions may sometimes be regarded
as normal ones.89 It is not insignificant, however, that in cases pre-
senting the latter situation, the transfers were to people who were
within the usual class of customers of the particular seller.90
The problem can best be made clear by first examining particular
statutory language. Nearly all of the statutes contain language
which more closely defines the business out of whose ordinary course
the transaction must be to fall within the purview of those statutes.
Although the language is not identical in these statutes, yet they
all provide in substance that the transaction must be out of the ordi-
nary course of trade and not in the regular and usual prosecution of
the setler's business91 It is the presence of the word "seller's," or its
equivalent, in the statutes which is responsible for the difficulty in a
substantial number of cases, for upon the interpretation given to
the phrase "seller's business" depends the answer as to whether cus-
tom in the trade, apart from what the particular seller has done
in the past, may be considered in establishing whether the trans-
action was unusual. Stated differently, the problem is whether that
language means the general line of business in which the seller is
engaged, or, instead, the particular business establishment, regarded
as a business entity, which the seller owns.
The answer regularly given to that question has been that it is the
way in which this particular seller did business, quite apart from cus-
tom in the industry, which controls.92 But it should not be assumed
that the courts have made explicit the reasoning process involved in
solving the problem in all of the cases. The first step, however, in any
determination of whether a particular transaction is or is not in the
ordinary course of the seller's business must, of necessity, be an in-
quiry into just what that business is, or indeed, whether there is any
87. See Billig and Branch, supra note 70 at 737, n.19.
88. See text at notes 73 to 78 supra.
89. See text at notes 79 to 80 spra.
90. Shasta Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 85 Cal. App. 468, 259 Pac. 965 (1927);
Hart v. Brierly, 189 Mass. 598, 76 N.E. 286 (1905).
91. Every bulk sales statute except those of Arizona and South Dakota con-
tains substantially equivalent language.
92. Jubas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950); Irving Trust Co. v.
Rosenwasser, 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss.
34, 150 So. 198 (1933); cf. Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256
S.W. 879 (1923); see Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 330, 122 At. 858, 859(1923).
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evidence to support a finding that there was any previously estab-
lished course of trade.
In Vacuum Oil Co. v. The Wichita Independent Consolidated Com-
panies" the seller was engaged in the business of selling lubricating
oils and greases in addition to motorcycles, bicycles and their ac-
cessories. Under the terms of a contract between himself and the
plaintiff, the seller obtained his year's supply of oil, about one hun-
dred barrels, at a reduced price. Since both his place of business and
his sales were small, the latter usually by the gallon, he normally
received delivery in lots of a few barrels. This method of doing busi-
ness continued for several years. In 1917, seller changed his mode
of taking delivery, getting an entire year's supply consisting of ninety
barrels in one shipment. He stored about five barrels on his premises,
as was his custom, and placed the remainder in a public warehouse.
Although a salesman was hired who took a few orders in pursuance
of a plan to sell by the barrel, those orders were not filled. Instead,
seller sold the entire eighty-five barrels to the defendant without
complying with the bulk sales statute. In the action brought by the
creditor against the non-complying purchaser, it was contended that
the former course of selling by the gallon had been abandoned and so
this transaction was not out of the ordinary course of any established
method of doing business: in short, that this was the very first trans-
action in what had not yet become an established mode of doing busi-
ness. The court rejected that contention. Assuming that the old
course of trade, i.e., selling by the gallon, had been abandoned, the
court felt that a new method, selling by the barrel, had been estab-
lished. That method then became the ordinary course of trade of this
seller, and the transaction in question was in fact a departure from it
and so within the scope of the statute. Since no sales were actually
made in pursuance of the new mode of doing business, it is evident
that to establish a course of trade, very little has to be done in pur-
suance of a plan to operate in a certain fashion. On the facts of this
case it seems very doubtful to this writer that enough was done. In
fact, the evidence shows clearly that no oil was actually sold by the
barrel, and in the face of that evidence it is difficult to conclude that a
course of trade had been established04 It is arguable, however, that
93. 110 Kan. 245, 203 Pac. 915 (1922).
94. Although based on a different rationale, Feldstein v. Fusco, 238 N.Y. 58,
143 N.E. 790 (1924), reversing 205 App. Div. 806, 201 N.Y. Supp. 4 (3d Dep't
1923), should be considered at this time. There, after he had disposed of a place
of business which he had previously operated as shoe repair shop, the alleged
bulk seller fraudulently obtained a truckload of leather which he caused to be
shipped to one place, not his place of business because he then had no place of
business, picked it up in a truck and transported it to another place where he
sold it as a truckload lot. The report is not clear on this point, but the sale of
the truckload may have been an unprecedented one, i.e., it is not improbable that
seller had previously parceled out and sold parts of other truckloads. The Court
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the previous course of trade had never been abandoned, an argument
the acceptance of which would be a more satisfactory reason for the
court's conclusion than the one offered.
* Under some circumstances a businessman may have an established
mode of operation which includes several quite different means of
disposing of his goods: for example, he might sell at both wholesale
and retail. Special problems are raised by such facts. Two cases
need consideration on that point. In both of them the seller, in ad-
dition to selling men's furnishings at retail, had done some selling
in job lots. In Osterweil v. Crean,95 the seller had made a practice of
buying one hundred to two hundred suits at a time. During the fol-
lowing two or three days, he would sell as many of them as possible
from his home at retail. Thereafter he would dispose of the balance
as a job lot to auction houses. Because of financial pressure, he pur-
chased some lots which he sold immediately to defendant, who was not
an auction house, without any effort to dispose of any of the suits at
retail. There were about ten such transactions within a period of
one month, and it is those transactions which were subjected to attack
on the ground that they fell within the purview of the bulk sales
statute.
In Sabin v. Horenstein,96 the seller had, for a period of several
years, sold in job lots in addition to the sales he made as a retail
merchant. Just prior to the seller's bankruptcy, the number of job
lot sales increased substantially. It was contended that the job lot
sales made within the few months immediately preceding the bank-
ruptcy, when taken collectively, constituted a sale in bulk out of the
ordinary course of business, reliance being placed on the greater
frequency of the sales during that period to prove the departure
from the usual. In both of the cases, the courts held that the depar-
tures from the ordinary were not sufficiently great to come within
the statutes. Here is a clear recognition that a businessman may have
more than one established mode of conducting his business, and that
a transaction will be invalidated under the bulk sales statutes only if
it falls outside any method of disposal established by a seller as his
way of operating.
But that rule is not without its limits. In Keller v. Fowler Bros.
& Cox, 9T the seller was a corporation which operated a chain of
grocery stores and which had a "1... sort of wholesale house, which
of Appeals held that the truckload in question had never become part of a mer-
cantile stock because never placed in a regular place of business of the seller.
Therefore, the statute was inapplicable. It should be noted that the factual simi-
larity between the Fekdstein and Vacuum Oil Company cases is a marked one,
although, of course, the courts viewed the problems quite differently.
95. 344 Pa. 465, 26 A.2d 307 (1942).
96. 260 Fed. 754 (9th Cir. 1919).
97. 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923).
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served as a depot, where a large stock was assembled from which the
wants of the retail stores were supplied."' Whenever one of the re-
tail stores proved unsuccessful financially, it was sold as a matter
of course. The transaction in question was the sale of the stock of
groceries kept in the wholesale depot without compliance with the
bulk sales statute. In a suit brought by the seller's trustee in bank-
ruptcy to recover from the purchaser the value of the stock of goods
so sold, it was contended that the transfer was not out of the ordi-
nary course of trade because the seller had regularly disposed of
unprofitable retail stores. In rejecting that contention the court said:
A sale does not have to be unprecedented to be out of the ordinary
course of trade. An individual operating an individual store
might sell out. He might buy another store and sell it out, and
repeat the process several times, but each of these sales would be
governed by the Bulk Sales Law. The business of. . . [seller]
was that of retailing groceries, not selling grocery stores. A sale
by it of a grocery store was out of the ordinary course of trade,
and it is immaterial that it may have made several such sales.2
The criterion is not simple to state. There can be no doubt that
if a corporation were organized for the purpose of buying and selling
retail grocery stores, a sale of one of the stores would clearly be in
the ordinary course of trade. But the mere fact that a particular
transaction, the sale of an unprofitable store, has been occasionally
engaged in by an enterprise, the substantial function of which is to
sell not grocery stores but groceries, is not enough to make the sale
of one of the stores a transaction in the ordinary course of trade of
that enterprise. The distinction between the Keller case and cases
like Sabin v. Horenstein and Osterweil v. Crean is not merely one of
degree, however, but one of kind. In the latter cases it cannot be said
that the business enterprise was ever disposed of, while in the former,
what may fairly be regarded, under the circumstances, as a unit of a
business of sufficient scope to be considered an enterprise in itself
was disposed of from time to time. Clearly the disposition of sub-
stantial mercantile enterprises is within the purview of all bulk sales
statutes.
Somewhat like the Sabin and Osterweil cases, but conceptually more
closely akin to the Keller case, is the situation in which the seller has
more or less regularly disposed of odds and ends, shop-worn merchan-
dise, discontinued lines and the like. The closer kinship to the Keller
case is due to the fact that the times and frequency of such trans-
actions are dictated by considerations of expediency which them-
selves occur irregularly. As a result of that irregularity it is difficult
to ascribe to the transactions themselves the kind of regularity or
usualness which the phrase, "ordinary course of trade," connotes.
98. 148 TENN. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923).
99. Id. at 576, 256 S.W. at 880.
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There is, however, a possible inference to be drawn from some of the
cases that should a seller be able to establish a pattern of disposition
of shop-worn or otherwise unsalable-at-retail merchandise, a trans-
action of that type would be in the regular prosecution of his business.
The inference arises from the fact that in several cases statements
have been made that an industry custom of this kind, apart from what
the seller in question usually did, was not controlling. There is a
possible negative inference that should such a practice on the part of
the particular seller be established, the transaction would fall outside
the purview of the statute.100
The case closest in point, however, seems to cast considerable doubt
on the correctness of such a rule. In Irving Trust Co. v. Rosen-
wasser,'02 the seller attempted to show on the witness stand that he
regularly made sales of "close-outs," apparently odds and ends that
he could not dispose of in the ordinary retail manner. Because the
trial judge apparently disbelieved the witness in any event, the re-
action of the judge to the argument that should such a state of facts
be established the sale was outside the scope of the statute, must be
regarded as a dictum. That reaction, however, bears on the point
under consideration. Judge Woolsey said:
... I think that the most which possibly could be said with regard
to the sale of "close-outs" by... [seller] was that it might have
been an incident, and, no doubt, a convenient incident of their
business-perhaps of any retail business-but it was not, prop-
erly speaking, in the ordinary course of any retail trade or the
regular prosecution of such retail business. 02
Clearly the judge had some reservations as to whether the fact of
periodicity in such transactions would be relevant in any case.
There remain for consideration the not inconsiderable number of
cases which have been concerned with the question of the relevance
of an established industry custom to the out of ordinary course prob-
lem. It should be remembered, however, that there is no substantial
authority that transactions of the kind involved in the Rosenwasser
case are taken out of the operation of bulk sales statutes even though
the particular seller regularly engaged in them.10 3
100. See text at notes 105 to 107 infra , for a discussion of those cases.
101. 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
102. Id. at 1017.
103 In New York Credit Men's Ass'n., Inc. v. Domestic Broadtail Producers,
Inc-, 61 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), one wholesale dealer in furs purchased
furs from another wholesale dealer. The original purchaser then entered into
a transaction the legal effect of which was a resale of some of the furs to the
original seller. The court held that the resale was not outside the ordinary
course of the re-sellers trade, primarily because the parties had had previous
dealings of the same nature. The extent or regularity of those prior dealings
is not disclosed. In Geiger v. Louis Yasser, Inc., 178 Misc. 526, 35 N.Y.S.2d 221(Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd without opinion, 265 App. Div. 1046, 40 N.Y.S.2d 332(1st Dep't 1943), the court stated that a return of goods to the seller thereof by
their purchaser fell within the scope of the statute.
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As indicated earlier, nearly all of the cases which have discussed
the point have taken the position that industry custom is irrelevant
in determining whether a transfer is out of the ordinary course of
trade.'"4
A recent important case is Jubas v. Samrpsel."h' There the seller,
a retail shoe merchant, had in stock 1,240 broken pairs of shoes which
had cost him between $5.25 and $8.25 a pair. These shoes constituted
25/, of his total stock in volume and 15% in value. After making
all reasonable attempts to sell them at retail without success, the
seller sold the lot at one dollar per pair, their fair value, without
complying with the bulk sales statute of California. Although the
seller was solvent at the time of the sale, he shortly thereafter be-
came bankrupt and plaintiff was appointed his trustee in bankruptcy.
In an action against the purchaser for the value of the 1,240 pairs of
shoes, the court held for the plaintiff. After first holding that the
subject matter of the transaction was a "substantial part" of the
seller's business within the meaning of that term in the statute,10 6
the court went on to state that:
[t]he "regular and usual practice and method of business of the
vendor" cannot be measured by a prevalent custom of merchants
which the vendor followed. The vendors herein were retail shoe
merchants whose regular and usual practice and method of
business was selling shoes to those who came into the store to
buy from the stock in trade for wear.
The plain meaning of the statute is that when a storekeeper
disposes of a substantial part of his stock in trade in bulk, and
selling in bulk sales is not the usual and ordinary way in which he
conducts his business from day to day, the sale falls within the
statute."7
On the other side of the argument is the most recent decision of
the New York Court of Appeals.t0s Again the seller was a retail shoe
merchant. In the spring of the year, when his total inventory was
worth about $19,000, the seller found himself with a large number
of fall and winter style shoes on hand. He sold 1,294 pairs of them
in one lot to a purchaser whose regular business was the purchase
of lots of off-season shoes from retailers. Although the 1,294 pairs did
104. Jubas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950); Irving Trust Co. v.
Rosenwasser, 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss.
34, 150 So. 198 (1933); ef. Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256
S.W. 880 (1923); see Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 330, 122 Atl. 858, 859
(1923).
105. 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950).
106. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953) provides in part, "The sale
of a stock in trade ... or a substantial part thereof ....
107. 185 F.2d 333, 334 (9th Cir. 1950). See also, Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss.
34, 150 So. 198 (1933); cf. Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256
S.W. 879 (1923); see Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 330, 122 Atl. 858, 859
(1923).
108. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 ( 1953), reversing
279 App. Div. 30, 108 N.Y.S.2d 218 (4th Dep't 1951).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
not constitute his entire stock of off-season shoes, nevertheless, they
amounted to about one-sixth of his total stock of shoes in value. There
was no indication that the price was not a fair one, nor was there
any indication that the sale was part of a plan to discontinue business.
The evidence disclosed that such a disposition was a standard practice
among small shoe dealers, primarily for the reason that to attempt
to sell the off-season shoes in the regular retail manner would be to
place them in competition with the other shoes in the store and thus
endanger the financial position of the entire enterprise. Declining to
follow the Jubas case, the Court of Appeals reversed a decision of the
Appellate Division and held the transfer outside the scope of the
statute. Because this is the only case taking such a position, and bd-
cause Judge Fuld states the reasons underlying it clearly and strongly,
it is worthy of quotation at length. After some preliminary state-
ments directed toward showing the general inapplicability of the
statute to all but the most unusual transactions, Judge Fuld went
on to say:
The record here shows that in the business of shoe retailing the
sale of "off-season" wares is no rare and irregular occurrence,
but rather an established operating pattern, no attempt to de-
fraud creditors, but rather an inevitable incident to the conduct
of business. Shoe styles may vary sharply from season to season
and year to year, with the result that last year's "rage" may clog
this season's shelves. As seasons change, a merchant seeks to
clear his store, and as rapidly as possible, of shoes still unsold.
Larger stores may resort to much publicized "clearance sales" or
operate their own "special outlet" stores. But the smaller, inde-
pendent retailer, lacking the means for extensive advertising or
a separate store, must, of necessity, rely on dealers specializing in
unseasonable obsolete shoes. Thus, as the record reveals... [pur-
chaser] alone regularly dealt with as many as "several hundred"
retailers in "smaller towns * ** throughout northern and western
New York."
Such recurring sales, vital as they may be to the operation of
the smaller independent retailer, must be regarded, in the words
of the statute, as sales made "in the ordinary course of trade and
in the regular prosecution of said business." Indeed, to subject
such transactions to the requirements prescribed by . . . [the
bulk sales statute] would tell creditors little more than they al-
ready know. They are forewarned, by industry and trade custom,
that "off season" sales are regular occurrences and, entirely apart
from the Bulk Sales Act, they may anticipate usual sales of ob-
solete leftovers and scrutinize such transactions beforehand.
And, if fraud or covert advantage is later unearthed, a creditor
may set it aside as a fraudulent conveyance under state law...
or as a preference or fraudulent conveyance under federal stat-
ute;...
In point of fact, to hold that these frequently repeated trans-
actions are controlled by... [the bulk sales law] might, contrary
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to the aim of the statute, render the creditor's lot more hazardous.
Even if a dealer could be found to purchase "off-season" stock
on the terms prescribed by the statute, the prices realized would
almost certainly be lower. Small retailers might, therefore, be
forced to rely upon markdown sales or below-cost clearances-
which as one expert testified at the trial, "would" make it "diffi-
cult * * * to sell the same customers other shoes at the list price."
The result, it is easy to see, might well be to curtail the retailer's
business and thus endanger prompt payment to his creditors. 0 9
It is of primary importance to realize that this decision resolves,
not one, but two of the problems in this area. In the first place it
assumes that had the seller engaged in close-out sales over a period
of time with regularity, such sales would be in the ordinary course of
trade. Thus, it appears to be at variance with the inference I drew
from the language of the Rosenwasser case.1 20 Secondly, it recog-
nizes, implicitly to be sure, that there is no basis for distinguishing
between the first sale of close-outs and the tenth sale of close-outs.
It should be recalled that there is a negative inference in some of the
cases refusing to admit evidence of a custom in the industry that,
should it be established that the seller in question had regularly en-
gaged in this sort of transaction as well as his regular retail sales, the
transaction would be regarded as falling outside the scope of the
statute."' It is unrealistic to find the first in a series of such trans-
actions within the statute and to find the tenth outside it. The first
is neither more nor less out of ordinary course than the tenth. Al-
though the soundness of the value judgment seems clear, there yet
remains the question of whether the statutory language is suscep-
tible of this interpretation. With respect to that point, recognition
must be given to the fact that courts have great flexibility in inter-
preting statutory language; perhaps they assume more power in
some instances than can be justified. 2 - In my opinion, however, this
is not such an instance. This is an example of statutory language
which can be interpreted in two different ways. The meaning is not
plain. On the other hand there is relatively little in the way of specific
extrinsic sources which might be utilized to solve the ambiguity.
Judge Fuld sought out and found such evidence in terms of the over-
all purpose of bulk sales legislation-protection of creditors. He con-
cluded that, as a practical matter, a contrary holding would probably
diminish rather than increase creditor protection. In so concluding he
109. 305 N.Y. at 240, 241, 112 N.E.2d at 212, 213.
110. Irving Trust Co. v. Rosenwasser, 5 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
111. See text at note 100 supra.
112. The reader is referred to text at notes 37 to 48 and 51 to 55 supra,
for a discussion of an instance in which I feel that the interpretation is outside
the limits placed on the court by the statutory language. I refer, of course, to
the earlier part of Judge Fuld's opinion in the Sternberg case where he, in effect,
emasculates the "any part" language of the statute.
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gave proper weight to the facts of commercial life. The decision is a
land-mark one and was long overdue.113
To recapitulate: In a few instances the "out of ordinary course"
language has been utilized as a quantitative criterion under statutes
containing no specific quantitative requirement, though it is not true
that all very large transfers are out of the ordinary course of .trade.
Although there are no decisions so holding, several of the statutes are
so phrased that the "out of ordinary course" language seems to be an
alternative quantity limitation when less than all or substantially all
of the business is sold. On the other hand, most of the cases have
treated the phrase as imposing a qualitative limitation, a limitation
which means that transfers need not be made in compliance with the
statute unless made in a certain way. In general it is a fair conclusion
to say that the most important factor is whether the sale was to
a person who was in the general class of purchasers from this seller.
A more specific analysis, however, reveals several sub-problems. It
is necessary first to find a regular course in order to determine whether
a particular transaction was outside it. In some instances the business
in question might have more than one regular method of disposing
of its merchandise, and if that be the case, the transfer falls outside
the statute if it is within any of those regularly-engaged-in methods.
On the other hand, there is a limit to that proposition. It is not neces-
sary that a transfer be entirely unprecedented to fall within the
statutes. This question has arisen most frequently in cases in which
the seller in question disposed of some property in a way not regular
with him but consistent with an industry practice. Although nearly
all of the cases have held such transfers to fall within the statutes,
the latest decision of the New York Court of Appeals on the question
seems clearly more consistent with commercial necessity and reality
in admitting such evidence and finding it conclusive on the point in
issue. In so doing that court has given a different interpretation to
the statutory language, "out of the ordinary course of trade and of
the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's business," than had
previously been given. To the New York Court of Appeals, the
"business" referred to in the statute was the line of business in which
the seller was engaged rather than the particular business enterprise
which he controlled.
113. An earlier recognition of the commercial realties of the situation may
be found in Judge Ethridge's dissenting opinion in the Cohen case, where he
says:
The ordinary course of trade, of course, means the ordinary course of trade
in the particular line of business in the locality where the transaction oc-
curs, or such as is generally or usually done in pursuit of such business.
Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss. 34, 41, 150 So. 198, 199 (1933).
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III. ADDITIONAL QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENTS PROBLEMS
Many of the statutes contain quantitative requirements applicable
to all situations or applicable only to some. Thus the statutes of Con-
necticut,"4 Illinois,"--, Missouri,",! Rhode Island' 17 and South Caro-
lina" , are under no circumstances applicable to transfers of less than
the major part of the included property. The California statute'"
requires compliance only if a "substantial part" is disposed of, and
the statutes of Kentucky,'-' New Jersey,":" North Carolina 22 and
Pennsylvania,- only if a "large part" is included. The Arizona
statutel-' applies only to transfers of 75% or more of the stock in
trade. In addition, many other statutes12 require compliance, if the
transfer is not out of the ordinary course of trade, only if all or sub-
stantially all of the stock is sold.
The words "major part" have been construed to mean more than
50% of the included property, an interpretation which is certainly
accurate in a literal sense.'*" "Substantial part" and "large part" are
not terms having such a specific meaning, and consequently the courts
have been called upon more frequently to decide whether a particular
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6705 (1949).
115. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1953).
116. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1949).
117. R.I. GEN. LAws c. 483, § 1 (1938).
118. S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952).
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953).
120. Ky. REV. STAT. § 377.010 (1953).
121. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940).
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950).
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 525 (1931).
124. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939).
125. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1951); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1703 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.05 (1944);
GA. CODE ANN. § 28-206 (1952); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-702 (1948); MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAws art. 83, § 99 (1951); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 274 (1942); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1001 (1941); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 71 (1937); ORE. REV. STAT. § 79.040 (1953); TENN. CODE ANN.
§728' (Williams 1934); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953). In addition the
Montana statute requires that all included transactions be in bulk and defines as
being in bulk "... any sale in one transaction of an entire stock of goods, wares,
merchandise or trade fixtures, or personal property, or of an entire stock of a
particular character of goods, wares, merchandise or trade fixtures, or personal
property of the vendor's business .... "MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 18-204 (1947).
The Washington statute applies to all or substantially all of the stock or all or
substantially all of the fixtures. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.010 (1951). If only
fixtures are' sold, the statutes of Louisiana, Nevada and Ohio are applicable only
if all or substantially all of them are sold. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950);
NEv. COMP. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949); OHIO GEN. Coon ANN. § 11102 (1938)
semble.
126. Zenith Radio Distributing Corporation v. Mateer, 311 Ill. App. 263, 35
N.E.2d 815 (1941). A one-half interest in a business was sold for the purpose
of forming a partnership. Refusing to hold that the transfer of an undivided
interest for the purpose of creating a partnership was not a disposition covered
by the statute, the court found the accepted meaning of the word "major" to be
"greater" or "larger" and so refused to include a transfer of but 50%. Although
the decision was criticized in Comment, 30 ILL. BJ. 298 (1942), it is clearly a cor-
rect interpretation of unambiguous language.
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transaction fell within the statutes containing such language. The
cases construing the California statute,12 7 which applies to transfers
of a "substantial part," indicate clearly that much less than one-half
of the total property will be regarded as a substantial part of it. Thus
the sale of between one-fifth and one-sixth of a stock of merchan-
dise, 28 a pledge of $600 worth of merchandise out of a total stock
valued at $9,500 to secure a loan of new money in the amount of
$300,29 and a sale of 25% of the stock in volume and 15% in value,,1 0
have all been held to be transfers of substantial parts within the
meaning of that language in the California statute."'
Frequently the meaning of the quantitative requirement of a bulk
sales statute comes up in connection with the disposal of a branch or
other more or less separable part of a business, but that problem
will be discussed in a later part of the article. Only one case has been
found which contained no problem of the disposal of a possibly sepa-
rate part of a business and which has construed the "large part"
language. In Armfield Co. v. Saleeby,1 2 the seller was a retail fruit
dealer having a normal inventory of between $1,500 and $5,000. As
Christmas approached, the stock was increased in size. The seller
purchased 179 barrels of apples in two lots of 79 and 100 barrels. He
then resold them from the cars in the same quantities without com-
plying with the statute. The total value of both lots was about $450.
In an action brought by a creditor of the seller, the defendant pur-
chaser requested an instruction to the effect that if the sale of either
lot consisted of 10% or less of the total stock, compliance with the
statute was not necessary. This instruction was refused, and the jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff creditor. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina reversed on the ground that the refusal of the re-
quested instruction was error. The court took the position that a
sale of 10% of a stock was not of a "large part" within the meaning
of that term in the statute, stating that "[ilt should be something
more than that or nearer a half of the stock to come under the con-
demnation of the statute."133
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953).
128. Schainman v. Dean, 24 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1928).
129. Markwell & Co. v. Lynch, 114 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1940).
130. Jubas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950).
131. That the mere fact that a sale is a large one is not enough to bring
it within the statute, if it is not also out of the ordinary course of trade, see,
Shasta Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 85 Cal. App. 468, 259 Pac. 965 (1927).
132. 178 N.C. 298, 100 S.E. 611 (1919). In Sproul v. Gambone, 43 F. Supp.
575 (W.D. Pa. 1942), a case involving the disposition of a part of the property
used in the retail end of a combination wholesale and retail tobacco and candy
business, the court held the transaction to be an included one on a finding (1)
that the subject matter of it constituted 821h% of the seller's fixed assets, and
the means of accomplishing 22%% of the entire business of the seller, and (2)
the retail end of the business was entirely disposed of.
133. Armfield Co. v. Saleeby, 178 N.C. 298, 301, 100 S.E. 611, 612 (1919).
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Two cases - in point were decided under an earlier Washington
statute. That statute required compliance in the case of
[a] ny sale... of a stock of goods, wares or merchandise, or all
or substantially all, of the fixtures and equipment... or whenever
substantially the entire business or trade.., shall be sold.., or
whenever an interest in... the business... is sold .... 135
Although differing from the present Washington statute which ex-
pressly applies to the sale of "... all or substantially all of a stock of
goods... ,"30 the earlier statute was, nevertheless, interpreted by the
Washington court to mean that all or substantially all of the stock of
goods must be sold to bring the transaction within its purview.2 7
The only case interpreting the present statute indicates that a trans-
fer of two-thirds of the included property would be sufficient to re-
quire compliance.","'
Several cases have been decided which seem to impose quantity
requirements under statutes which have no specific quantitative cri-
terion, at least under the facts of the case in question."39 It has been
said, for example, that for a transaction to be included under an
"any part" statute, it must be of a "material portion." 140 And in
Sternberg r. Rubenstein,'1 as has already been indicated,4 2 the New
York Court of Appeals recently stated that only transfers of . . . sub-
stantially an entire inventory or business"' 4 fall within the statute.
134. Fudge v. Brown, 126 Wash. 475, 218 Pac. 251 (1923); Blanchard Co.
v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923).
13!5. Wash. Laws 1913, c. 175, § 4.
1-36. WAsH. REv. CODE § 63.08.010 (1951).
1:37. In Blanchard Co. v. Ward. 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923), the
court held the statute inapplicable to the sale of the sheet music department
of a general retail piano store and music house. The value of the stock sold was
about 5 to 7% of the value of the total stock. The court concluded that the
statute did not "... prohibit the sale of a portion of the stock .... " Id. at 208,
213 Pac. at 930. Although the portion sold was small, yet the court's language
is sufficiently broad to indicate applicability to the disposition of much larger
proportions. No explanation of the meaning of the "interest in" language was
offered. The same position was taken in Fudge v. Brown, 126 Wash. 475, 218
Pac. 251 (1923), with principal reliance being placed on the Blanchard Co. case.
It should be noted that in the Fudge case, somewhere between 7% and 25% of
the total stock was sold. The court did not think it material what the exact
proportion was because, in any event, it was the sale of a portion only.
138. Minder v. Gurley, 37 Wash. 2d 123, 222 P.2d 185 (1950).
139. The reference is to those statutes cited in note 125 supra, which impose
a specific quantitative requirement only if the sale is not out of ordinary course.
140. Fiske Rubber Co. v. Hayes, 131 Ark. 248, 199 S.W. 96 (1917). In
Huckins v. Smith, 29 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1928), the court held that a transfer
of the fixtures of a business of which the value of the fixtures was about one-
half of the total value of the stock and fixtures, was a transfer of a material
part. Illustrative of the reliance by courts of one state on cases decided under
an entirely different statute is Armfield Co. v. Saleeby, 178 N.C. 298, 100 S.E.
611 (1919), decided under a "large part" statute. The North Carolina court
relied principally on the Fiske Rubber Co. case which was, of course, decided
under an "any part" statute.
141. 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953), reversing 279 App. Div. 30, 108
N.Y.S.2d 218 (4th Dep't 1951).
142. See text at notes 37 et seq. supra.
143. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 239, 112 N.E.2d 210, 212 (1953).
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Elsewhere, cases may be found which hold that certain transfers fall
within the scope of such a statute even though their subject matter
constitutes much less than substantially all of the business.14" It is,
of course, true that some of the courts which have given quantitative
meaning to the "in bulk" or "out of ordinary course" language have
excluded transfers on quantity grounds, but those cases have already
been discussed. 45 It seems clear under statutes of this class that the
legislature intended to impose no specific quantitative limitations;
that small transfers may otherwise be sufficiently unusual to justify
including them in the coverage of such statutes; and that those courts
which have seemingly imposed quantity requirements, either generally
or by so interpreting the "in bulk" and "out of ordinary course" re-
quirements, have added requirements judicially to those imposed
legislatively.
Because of the fact that some of the statutes, either because of ex-
press language or because of judicial interpretation leading to the
same result, impose independent quantity requirements, the question
has occasionally arisen as to whether a business may be divided into
units for the purpose of determining whether a sufficient quantity
has been transferred to cause the transaction to fall within the scope
of the statute. It is clear that if what is sold may be classified as the
includible property of a separate business unit, it will be so regarded
for the purpose of determining whether the quantitative requirement
for inclusion has been met. All of the cases directly in point, and in
which the question has been explicitly determined, have arisen under
statutes which contain express language requiring that either a
"major part" or a "large part" of the business be sold to bring the
transaction within them.146
144. Goldstein v. Maloney, 62 Fla. 198, 57 So. 342 (1911); Virginia-Carolina
Chemical Co. v. Bouchelle 12 Ga. App. 661, 78 S.E. 51 (1913); Vacuum Oil Co.
v. The Wichita Independent Consolidated Companies, 110 Kan. 245, 203 Pac.
915 (1922); Norton-Berger Shoe Company v. J.B. Rideau 1 La. App. 244
(1924) ; Tupper v. Barrett, 233 Mass. 565, 124 N.E. 427 (1919). Cohen v. Cal-
houn, 168 Miss. 34, 150 So. 198 (1933); Mahoney-Jones Co. v. dams Bros., 128
Tenn. 207, 159 S.W. 1094 (1913)- Slaughter v. Cooper Corporation, No. 2, 20
Tenn. App. 241, 97 S.W.2d 648 (1936); Henry King & Co. v. Arnett Brothers,
7 Tenn. App. 410 (1928). Compare Goodman v. Clarkson, 39 Ga. App. 383, 147
S.E. 183 (1928), with Long Cigar and Grocery Co. v. Harvey, 33 Ga. App. 236,
125 S.E. 870 (1924). Contra: Splain v. B.F. Goodrich Rubber Co., 290 Fed. 275(D.C. Cir. 1923). In The Citizens State of Hiawatha v. Rogers, 155 Kan. 478,
126 P.2d 214 (1942), decided under an "any part" statute, the court held a
mortgage of all the fixtures of a business to fall within the statute but said:
The bulk sales law was designed to prevent defrauding of creditors by the
secret sale or disposal in bulk of substantially all of a merchant's stock of
goods or fixtures pertaining thereto. [Italics added.]
Id. at 479, 126 P.2d at 215.
145. See Sections I and II supra.
146. In re Lipman, 201 Fed. 169 (D.C.N.J. 1912); Young v. Lemieux, 79
Conn. 434, 65 Atl. 437 (1906); Frieling v. Emling, 248 Ill. App. 475 (1928);
Ogden Avenue State Bank v. Cherry, 225 Ill. App. 201 (1922). See also Goodman
v. Clarkson, 39 Ga. App. 383, 147 S.E. 183 (1928); Gwinn Brothers & Co. v.
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There are, however, several other cases which might have turned
on the question of whether the stock sold was that of a separate busi-
ness, but which did not in fact do so. Many of them were decided
under "any part" statutes which raised no quantity problems, 14 and,
in another, a quantity sufficient to constitute a large part was sold even
when all parts of the business were considered together for purposes
of deciding what proportion of the total includible property was
sold.1" And in one of the cases the fact that both parts of the business
were sold as substantially part of the same transaction, though to
different people, served as the basis for a decision that there was, in
effect, but one sale of the entire enterprise. 4 9 In Blanchrd Co. v.
WardY'' the court took no notice of the fact that the subject matter
of the transaction comprised the whole of the sheet music department
of a general retail piano store and music house, and held that an in-
sufficient quantity of the total stock of the entire enterprise was dis-
posed of to bring the transaction within the Washington statute.
In a number of cases the transfers attacked consisted of a series
of technically separate transfers, either all to the same person but
at different times, or to different persons. In addition, there are three
forms of language related to the problem, one or more of which occur
in some of the statutes. The Arizona 15 and Montana'9 2 statutes cover
only sales in a single transaction. The Missouri and Rhode Island
statutes are applicable to transfers ".... in one or more parcels or to
one or more persons, provided the transfer is all part of substantially
one transaction or proceeding or occurs substantially at one time.
The statutes of the District of Columbia,'4 Florida,15r
Georgia,,b Maryland,5" and Oregon*s8 contain no "single transaction"
Peoples General Store, 269 Ky. 813, 108 S.W.2d 1001 (1937). In Roberts v.
Kaemmerer, 220 Mo. App. 582, 287 S.W. 1057 (1926), defendant contracted to
sell one of the two retail florists shops which he owned. He later agreed to
supply a list of merchandise creditors of the store he sold but not of the other
store. Purchaser insisted on a complete list of creditors and refused to complete
the transaction when defendant declined to furnish such a list. In the ensuing
action for breach of contract, the court assumed that compliance with the statute
was necessary without any direct inquiry into the value of each store, though
the Missouri statute (Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.020 [Vernon 1949] ) requires com-
pliance only if the sale is of a major part of the includible property.
147. Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 122 Atl. 858 (1923) ; Conquest v. Gold-
man, 121 Me. 335, 119 AtI. 528 (1922) ; Mott v. Reeves, 125 Misc. 511, 211 N.Y.
Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd without opinion, 217 App. Div. 718, 215 N.Y.
Supp. 889 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mem.. 246 N.Y. 567, 159 N.E. 654 (1927);
Kirkholder & Rausch Co. v. Bridgland, 120 Misc. 565, 199 N.Y. Supp. 113 (Sup.
Ct. 1923), aff'd without opinion, 211 App. Div. 838, 206 N.Y. Supp. 923 (4th
Dep't 1923) ; Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 880 (1923);
State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N.W.2d 433 (1952).
148. Sproul v. Gambone, 43 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
149. Corrigan v. Miller, 338 111. App. 212, 86 N.E.2d 853 (1949).
150. 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923).
151. ARiz. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939).
152. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 18-204 (1947).
153. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1949); R.I. GEN. LAWs c. 483, § I
(1938).
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language, and make it immaterial whether the transfer is to one or
more persons. The purpose of this section is to determine whether
courts have treated a series of such transfers as a single transfer for
any purpose in bulk sales cases.
The simplest situation is that posed by a series of sales to a single
individual within a relatively short period of time. In Slaughter v.
Cooper Corporation No. 2,11, the court viewed a series of six purchases
made within a period of six days as one transaction for the purpose
of determining whether a sufficient quantity of goods had been sold
to require compliance with the statute. Dicta to the same effect may
be found in other cases."0
If, on the other hand, the separate transfers have been to different
persons, additional difficulty is encountered. The problems may arise
in several ways. It will be recalled that the Illinois bulk sales statute
applies only to transfers of a "major part" of the included property.1o
In Larson v. Jud,1162 the seller was a dairy farmer who sold milk at
retail. His property fell into three principal groups: (a) twenty-one
head of cattle, which constituted the major part in value of his prop-
erty; (b) five horses, two wagons, some harness and a corn planter,
all with a value of $650; and (c) sundry small articles, including
household furniture, of a total value of $250. Because seller's lease
had an expiration date of March 1, he decided to dispose of his prop-
erty late in February. On February 28, he sold part (a) to one Aiken
who was not a party to the controversy. On March 2, he sold part (b)
to defendant, who was in no way connected with the purchaser of
part (a). In the enusing action the court held the statute inappli-
cable to the second transaction. The court said:
The major part of those goods and chattels (the cattle) were
sold to Aiken before the purchase by . . . [defendant] of the
horses and other items in group "b," therefore ... [defendant]
did not buy the major part of the goods and chattels. There is
154. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 28-1703 (1951).
155. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.05 (1944).
156. GA. CODE ANN. § 28-206 (1952).
157. MO. ANN. CODE GSN. LAWS art. 83, § 99 (1951).
158. ORE. R v. STAT. § 79.040 (1953).159. 20 Tenn. App. 241, 97 S.W.2d 648 (1936).160. Sabin v. Horenstein, 260 Fed. 754, 755 (9th Cir. 1919); Thorndike &
Hix Lobster Co. v. Hall, 223 App. Div. 576, 578, 229 N.Y. Supp. 225, 227 (3d
Dep't 1928). In Osterweil v. Crean, 344 Pa. 465, 26 A.2d 307 (1942), the court
assumed that a series of sales to one person could be considered together for
the purpose of determining whether enough was sold, but held the transfer to be
in the ordinary course of trade. In Carpenter v. Karnow, 193 Fed. 762 (D.C.
Mass. 1911), the court stated that even though a series of five transfers were
to be regarded as one transaction, they were nevertheless not in bulk because not
all of the stock was disposed of. In Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 122 Atl.
858 (1923), each transfer in the series was of sufficient quantity to come within
an "any part" statute.
161. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1953).
162. 200 IM. App. 420 (1916).
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no ground for connecting... [defendant] in any way with the
vendor's sale to Aiken of the major part of his property, there-
fore we are not called upon to say what might be the effect of the
purchase by different vendees acting in concert of the whole or
major part of such goods and chattels, no one vendee buying the
major part thereof. If... [defendant] had purchased the goods
in item "c" before the sale to Aiken of the major part of the prop-
erty, he would not have been within the prohibition of the statute
because he would not have purchased the major part of the goods
and chattels, and his purchase could not have been invalidated
by some subsquent action of his vendor and some third person
with which he had no connection.
We do not think the vendor's property left after the sale of the
cows can be regarded as the goods and chattels of his business
within the meaning of the statute, in determining what was the
major part of his property that... [defendant] was prohibited
from buying except under the conditions imposed by the stat-
ute.'1
Thus it is evident that the court regarded the subject matter of the
two sales as one unit for the purpose of determining the parts of the
property to consider in deciding whether one of the sales constituted
the required fraction, but declined to conclude that there was only
one transaction because there was in fact no connection between the
two purchasers.
In Main v. Hall," ' on the other hand, the court reached an opposite
conclusion. There a farmer leased his farm with the intention of not
returning to farming. He sold off parts of his property from time to
time, each sale being less than a major part of his total property.
Finally, he sold all the cattle on the place to one Main. The cattle
constituted a major part in value of the personal property the seller
then owned, but less than a major part of the original property before
any of the sales. The court did not cite the Larson case,'6 and in
answer to the contention that less than a major part was sold, said
that the seller
.. may not evade the act by properly selling some of his prop-
erty, and then dealing with all or a major part of what is left
contrary to the provisions of the act, and thereby defraud his
creditors. If the laudable purposes of the act could be thus
evaded, its practical usefulness would be slight...
163. 200 II1. App. 423 (1916).
164. 41 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1930), affirming sub now. Hall v. Main, 34 F.2d
528 (E.D. 111. 1929).
165. The reason given by the lower court for not following the Larson case
was an Illinois statutory provision, Ill. Laws 1877, p. 69, § 17, part of which
follows:
Provided, That such opinion [that of one of the intermediate appellate
courts] shall not be of binding authority in any cause or proceeding, other
than in that in which they [sic] may be filed.
The proviso was eliminated by Ill. Laws 1935, p. 696, § 1. See 30 ILL. L. RiV.
386 (1935).
166. Main v. Hall, 41 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1930).
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The cases are, of course, diametrically opposed on the point, for in
the Main case the court considered the transactions as entirely sepa-
rate for both the purpose of determining the base unit and, inciden-
tally, for the purpose of determining what constituted the subject
matter of the transaction under attack. To state it differently: the
statute requires that more than one-half be sold; that suggests a
fraction with, of course, a numerator and a denominator; with respect
to a particular set of facts, the numerator must be the value of the
property sold and the denominator the value of the total property
of the vendor's business; the question is what may be included in the
numerator and what may be included in the denominator. In the
Larson case, the subject matter of separate transactions was added
together to determine the denominator, but was not added together
to determine the numerator, and in the Main case the subject matter
of the transactions was not added together for either purpose.107
In Cor7igan v. Miller,'8 a third possible answer was given : 6 the
subject matter of the sales was added together for both purposes,
with the result that the transaction, viewed as a whole, was included. 70
There, seller conducted both a marble contracting business and a Tile-
Tex business. He sold to one Adame the materials and equipment
used in the marble contracting business for approximately $1,800.
As part of the same agreement, Corrigan bought the property used
in the Tile-Tex business for approximately $800. The issue presented
in the case was whether the sale of the property of the Tile-Tex busi-
ness fell within the statute. The court held that it did, saying:
The fact that appellee purchased the smaller part and Adame
the larger part of the vendor's goods and chattels does not take
the sale out of the provisions of the Bulk Sales Act. Between
them, appellee and Adame purchased in a single transaction sub-
stantially the whole of the stock of goods and chattels and equip-
ment used by... [seller] in his Tile-Tex and marble contracting
business. Appellee purchasing all of the stock of merchandise
and equipment used in the Tile-Tex part of his business, and
167. In Fitz Henry v. Munter, 33 Wash. 629, 74 Pac. 1003 (1903), the court
held that the sale of what remained after part of a stock of goods was sold at
auction was covered by the Washington statute, a statute later interpreted to be
applicable only in the situation where all or substantially all of the goods were
sold.
168. 338 Ill. App. 212, 86 N.E.2d 853 (1949).
169. Logically, of course, there must be a fourth possible answer, since there
are two questions which can be answered independently, and since we are con-
sidering the results of the various possible combinations of the answers to the
two questions. Thus, it would be theoretically possible to combine the separate
transactions for the purpose of determining the numerator but not for the
purpose of determining the denominator, but such a result would be absurd.
170. It should be noted that if the two transactions are not added together
for the purpose of determining the denominator, whether they are added together
for the purpose of determining the numerator is immaterial. Conversely, if the
two transactions are added together for the purpose of determining the numera-
tor, it matters not whether they are also added together to determine the de-
nominator, although the failure to do so would be strange indeed.
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Adame substantially all of the merchandise and equipment used
in the marble part of his contracting business. [Italics added.] 171
It is clear that if all transfers are added together for both the purpose
of determining the numerator and the purpose of determining the
denominator, or if the transfers are not added together for either
purpose, the result will be the same: the statute will be considered
applicable. But if, on the other hand, the transfers are added together
for the purpose of determining the denominator but not for the pur-
pose of determining the numerator, compliance with the statute will
be considered unnecessary, as illustrated by the Larson case.
By way of critique, it seems clear that the Corrigan case is correct,
but that the choice between the Larson and Main cases is not so
obvious. On the whole, however, it seems improper to combine the
transactions for one purpose and not the other-improper not merely
from the viewpoint of logical consistency but more importantly from
that of desirability of result. Under the Larson rule, circumvention
of the statute would be a simple matter indeed. It is important to
note, however, that the rationale of the Corrigan case is useful only
in the situations in which there is a real connection between the vari-
ous purchasers, and, of course, it should be used in such a situation.
Absent that situation, however, the desired result may be obtained
only through an application of the Main rule.
Another case explicitly raising the issue of whether sales to more
than one person may be considered as a single transaction for bulk
sales purposes presents that problem in a quite different context. In
Hughes-Curry Packing Co. v. Sprague,172 the seller sold his fixtures
to defendant, and, on the same day, sold his stock in trade to persons
unknown. In an action brought by a creditor of the seller to have
defendant declared a receiver of the fixtures, the court held that there
was no connection shown to exist between the purchaser of the fix-
tures and the purchaser of the merchandise; that, therefore, the
transactions had to be considered separately; that under the Indiana
statute the sale of fixtures alone is not an included transaction; that,
therefore, the statute had no application to the transfer before the
court.
There remains for consideration the question of whether a relation-
ship or concert of action between two purchasers should be considered
essential to a holding that there has been but one transaction. If
the problem is examined strictly from the viewpoint of what the
seller has done, it is an easy conclusion to reach that the various
171. Corrigan v. Miller, 338 111. App. 212, 217, 86 N.E.2d 853, 856 (1949).In Landers Frary & Clark v. Vischer Products Co., 201 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1953),
the court considered both the transfer of the tangible assets of a corporation
to another corporation and the transfer of the intangibles to the stockholders
of the transferring corporation to be covered by the Illinois statute.
172. 200 Ind. 540, 165 N.E. 318 (1929).
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transfers should be combined for the purpose of holding the statute
applicable.17 3 But there is another group of persons involved, the
purchasers. If there is in fact no concert of action between them,
certainly if there is no awareness of the details of a scheme of dis-
position, it is manifestly unfair to hold them liable twice for the value
of goods purchased in good faith and under circumstances where the
statutory language indicates that no need for compliance exists. Thus,
the result of the Indiana case seems sound, and if, in the Corrigan
case, there had been entirely separate transactions and the smaller
part of the property had been sold first, there would seem to be no
basis for holding the first purchaser responsible under the statute.
On the other hand, the Larson case seems clearly wrong, for there is
no reason to excuse the purchaser from determining the amount of
goods and chattels on hand at the time of his purchase."',
The contention might be made that the language found in some of
the statutes precludes the necessity for showing a concert of action
between purchasers. Although that contention seems unsound if the
statute does no more than make immaterial the fact that the transfer
is to more than one person,175 for the same basic element of unfairness
discussed above would be present there, quite a different situation
would seem to obtain under the Rhode Island170 and Missouri 7 stat-
utes. Those statutes make the fact that there is more than one pur-
chaser immaterial only if .... the transfer is all part of substantially
one transaction or proceeding or occurs substantially at one time .... "
That language suggests that even though it is not a single transaction,
the transfers will be included provided there is but little time between
them. Although no decisions on the point have been found, it is at
least arguable that a different interpretation is preferable. Thus it
173. See 3 IND. L.. 565 (1928), for a favorable comment on the decision of
the intermediate appellate court which reached the opposite conclusion. Hughes-
Curry Packing Co. v. Sprague, 159 N.E. 434 (Ind. App. 1928), rev'd, 200 Ind.
540, 165 N.E. 318 (1929).
174. Although in other cases a 'stock of goods was sold out in a series of
sales to different persons, in each of them the sale under attack alone constituted
a disposal of sufficient quantity to bring it within the statute. Schainman v.
Dean, 24 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1928); Cohen v. Calhoun, 168 Miss. 34, 150 So.
198 (1933); Henry King & Co. v. Arnett Brothers 7 Tenn. App. 410 (1928).
See also Tupper v. Barrett, 233 Mass. 565, 124 N.19. 427 (1919); State Bank
of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N.W.2d 433 (1952). In Conquest v.
Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 122 Atl. 858 (1923), seller owned two businesses which he
carried on in adjoining premises, one a small retail grocery business, the other
a small retail paint and paper business. He sold substantially all of his stock
of paper to defendant for cash, then he sold his grocery business to a third
party, and finally sold his stock of paint to defendant. The court considered the
sales separately, and found both sales to the defendant to be bulk sales, and
so within the statute. In Conquest v. Goldman, 121 Me. 335, 119 Atl. 528 (1922),
the court held what was apparently the sale of the stock of the grocery store
within the statute.
175. See notes 154-159 supra.
176. R.I. GEN. LAws c. 483, § 1 (1938).
177. Mo. ANx. STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss3/2
BULK SALES
might be said that even though there can be no requirement of any
real concert of action between the purchasers, yet successive transfers
to different individuals should be joined together for this purpose
only if there is shown to be knowledge on the part of each of them
that other sales are known to have been made or that the making of
such other sales is contemplated.' "
IV. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SOLUTION 17
Section 6- 102 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines a bulk
transfer as ".... any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course
of the transferor's business of a major part of the ... inventory of
an enterprise subject . . ." to the article, but includes within the
definition "[a] transfer of a substantial part of the equipment...
if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory, but not
otherwise." Thus, it is apparent that all three of the usual require-
ments, "in bulk," "out of ordinary course," and a quantity require-
ment must be met before a transfer is included. Neither "in bulk"
nor "not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business" is
further defined in the Article, so it would appear that the same inter-
pretation problems which have given rise to the difficulties described
in this article will still be with the courts and lawyers should the
Code be adopted. But the fact that a specific quantitative requirement
has been imposed lessens greatly the import of these problems. Under
such a statute the "not in ordinary course" criterion usually will be
automatically satisfied if a major part is sold, for the circumstances
are uncommon in which one-half of the chattels of a business are
sold in the ordinary course of trade. Still the language is necessary
in order to exclude the rare business in which it is not unusual to sell
that much. The "in bulk" language can best be utilized to include a
series of transfers which, when viewed collectively, constitute a major
part of the included property; in fact, it would seem to have no other
possible purpose in the Code. The selection of a specific quantitative
criterion of a substantial nature represents a recognition on the part
of the draftsman that the truly serious bulk sales risks are inherent
only in transfers which enable the seller to pocket the proceeds of a
business and disappear, but that, on the other hand, a requirement
that the entire business must be sold would open the door to evasion.
178. For a discussion of the possibility that under some statutes the "in
bulk" language should be interpreted to require a relationship between the
transfers, see text at note 54 supra.
179. All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the Official Draft,
Text and Comments Edition (1952), as amended by Recommendations of the
Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition, dated June 1, 1953.
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CONCLUSION
Bulk sales statutes invariably contain certain phrases the purpose
of which is to distinguish routine commercial transactions from those
to which the statutes are designed to apply. Some of the requirements
are basically quantitative, others qualitative. Yet some of them, the
"in bulk" and "out of ordinary course" requirements, have been
interpreted by some courts as imposing quantitative requirements, by
others as imposing qualitative requirements. Partly because there is
a close relationship between the various requirements, it has not
proven feasible to differentiate them completely. However, "out of
ordinary course" is basically a qualitative requirement, although in
a limited number of instances the giving of a quantitative meaning
to it is justified. It is difficult, however, to regard the "in bulk" lan-
guage as quantitative in nature. This is because it occurs in statutes
which also contain either one of two basic types of language: (1) that
the sale of "any part" is included, (2) that only the sale of a certain
quantity comes within the statute. In the former situation, the legis-
lature has apparently not seen fit to impose any quantitative limit:
certainly it is not the function of the court to utilize the "in bulk"
language for that purpose. In the latter situation, the legislature has
seen fit to impose a quantity minimum, but it has selected what that
minimum will be. Again the courts cannot, with propriety, use the
"in bulk" language to impose an additional quantity limit. I have
suggested that the "in bulk" language can be utilized without in-
curring those difficulties only by regarding it as a device for connect-
ing what are technically separate transfers. Although courts have
chosen so to connect transfers under limited circumstances, they have
not usually relied on the "in bulk" language for that purpose.
The striking failure of the courts to examine closely the language
of the statute controlling a particular case is more apparent in this
area than in any other considered. There is indeed in this area a
remarkable uniformity of interpretation of the bulk sales statutes,
but in some instances the uniformity is unjustified: the statutes con-
tain language so dissimilar that uniformity of result can suggest
only error in construction rather than a basically sound concurrence
as to the meaning of words. But I do not mean to suggest that the
results of a larger number of the cases should differ from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. As a practical matter most of the transactions sub-
jected to attack would qualify for inclusion under any of the statutory
language considered here. It is apparently for that reason that the
failure of the courts to distinguish cases based on statutory language,
seemingly so different as to force another conclusion in the com-




Although the Uniform Commercial Code solution represents the
best ideas of the present statutes, it is, nevertheless, less satisfactory
here than in the other areas considered. Although many of the prob-
lems discussed in this chapter are unlikely to arise under the Uniform
Commercial Code section because of the "major part" requirement,
there remain, nevertheless, some unanswered questions. The first
of them is what meaning should be assigned to the "in bulk" lan-
guage. I believe that the only proper meaning of the phrase in the
context of a statute such as this is the one I have suggested above.
Are the circumstances such that the series of technically separate
transfers subjected to attack should be considered as an entity to
satisfy the major part requirement? If given that meaning, the "in
bulk" language can serve a useful purpose. It would have been better,
however, to spell out that meaning in the statute. The other un-
answered question is whether evidence, showing a custom in the
seller's line of business to dispose of shop-worn goods, odds and ends,
unseasonable merchandise and the like, is admissible to determine
whether the transfer under attack is in the regular prosecution of
the seller's business. On that point, I believe that the evidence should
be admitted on the basis of the reasons suggested by Judge Fuld in
the Sternberg case,"s' and that, therefore, the Code should have so
provided. Considered as a whole, however, I believe that the section
will provide little difficulty in most cases.
180. Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210 (1953), reversing
279 App. Div. 30, 108 N.Y.S.2d 218 (4th Dep't 1951).
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